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TKP at 106! The struggle continues, growing stronger.



Turns out, the transcripts were fake after all
What is real about the peace process, then?

Kemal Okuyan - TKP General Secretary



E.n.: Last month, Turkey entered a new phase in the talks between the government and the PKK, which the government calls “Terror-Free Turkey” and most people simply refer to as the new “peace process”. The parliament passed a “framework law” that grants partial amnesty to members of the Kurdish armed movement. The government provided little public information about either the drafting of the law or its contents before pushing it through the parliament, prompting controversy. Soon afterwards, another story hit the headlines: leaked transcripts purportedly from various meetings involving Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader who remains in prison on İmralı Island.

The publication of the transcripts unsettled the parties to a process they had kept out of the public eye from the outset, and Abdullah Öcalan himself eventually denied their authenticity. Even so, when we look at everything that has reached the press so far, along with public statements and the policies now taking shape, the ideas set out in those transcripts bore a striking resemblance to the increasingly clear direction and ideological framework of the process itself.

In this article, which was published in the September issue of TKP's monthly magazine Ortaklaşa, Kemal Okuyan examines the political alignments and debates emerging around this process. He also returns to its now largely clear ideological and political substance, what it means for Turkey's future, and the position and struggle of communists in relation to it.

All sorts of transcripts started circulating, some long, some short. At first, nobody said, "No, these are fake." After all, as a rule, journalists got documents like these from people at the negotiating table. The same people had also set up a number of messaging groups. One news site would publish the

material first, then the rest would follow. The transcripts included notes of meetings with a purpose to convince certain sections to the “new peace process”. They needed to circulate. People needed to hear about them so that they could work!

But once they spread, trouble followed! When people who read the transcripts with their heads rather than “under some spell” started to single out certain truths about the “new peace process”, the first pushback was, “you’re taking this out of context.” When that failed, they accused people of trying to discredit Öcalan. Finally came the official statement: “A complete fabrication!” We do not know quite how far the phrase “a complete fabrication” extends. We do not produce these transcripts, we do not sit in on the meetings, and we have no wish to. Experience also tells us that in processes like this, people routinely circulate fake documents or make “miniscule” alterations to meeting notes.

So, we don’t know whether the transcripts we’ve read, the ones making the news, are genuine, including the ones nobody has denied so far.

What's more, some of the meetings that people claim took place may be pure invention.

Tomorrow someone may even pop up and say, "We never even met."

Because, as with every important matter the authorities hide from the public, those in power either manufacture the facts or bury them! The aim is for society to lose its bearings in the fog.

Those at the table said, "we never discussed any of this." Yet what we read closely matched what they had actually done and what they had already said elsewhere. Yes, there were times even we couldn't help and said "no way", but we'd exclaimed "no way" before too, and every single time, it turned out to be a way after all.

Still, they said no. Well then, what can you do? We have to take the people at the table at their word. So, into the bin go the transcripts, or at least some of them...

Even so, we can still find our bearings, never mind whether the transcripts are lying to us or liars are manufacturing the transcripts!

But first, a quick bit of ground-clearing...

Accusations of the sort that say we “don’t want the conflict to end” simply don’t fit us, not in a million years. For years, long before these so-called peace processes, which some count as two and others as four, we stressed that the conflict was driving working people apart from one another. We said, “you can’t reduce this problem to terrorism,” but we also said, “this is terrorism,” without paying any attention to the sniping that came our way from a muddle-headed “left”.

Oddities like “how can you sit down with the terrorists” were never our style either. If a conflict is going to end, people talk, people sit at the table. “Why did you sit down” was always a question from empty rhetoric with no real content and it has always been too easy for them to deal with rhetorical objections. It’s a gift to those in power!

The state had already been talking to Öcalan for years. It is talking to him in this process too. Of course it should.

But what do they discuss, how do they discuss it, and to what end? Those are the real questions waiting for an answer.

Those in power have declared Öcalan a “founding element”, and that declaration proves PKK circles right when they say, “they had to acknowledge us.” Every one of Öcalan’s statements that nobody has denied so far (!) shows him acting with exactly that mission and that same confidence.

In short, the AKP presents its electoral victories to date as “the manifestation of the national will”, while the PKK declares Öcalan’s legitimacy “as the outcome of an era of armed struggle that has now come to an end”.

So, since both sides accept this, are we supposed to keep quiet?

No way!

Treating Öcalan as a legitimate counterpart, sorting out his legal status, none of that is the real problem. The real problem is that the authorities have decided to use a man they themselves have long called a “baby killer” to clear away the obstacles blocking the social and political changes they want, obstacles they haven’t managed to get past until now.

That is what we object to. And to anyone who responds with some version of “what’s it to you if both sides are happy?”, we can give exactly the same answer: What’s it to you?!

Everyone makes their choice, and the struggle goes on.

We have opposed this transformation outright from the very beginning. We have fought it, and we will continue to fight it. We do not need their transcripts, minutes or records to describe what this transformation amounts to. In fact, there is very little left for us to wonder about. The transcripts were useful only because they might wake up those who still look at this process in all innocence and ask, "Could this perhaps solve some of Turkey's problems?". That is all!

Everything else is already out in the open. Point by point. In ways nobody can deny. The heading over all of it is Neo-Ottomanism. It encompasses a reckoning with 1923, sectarianism, expansionism and pan-Islamism. Countless statements and articles support all four. Nobody can call that "a complete fabrication". Nor do they particularly want to. They want people to reconcile with this.

Whether this is what the PKK's base actually wanted is another question. But we have said it a hundred times, a thousand times. Ethnic, identity-driven politics can end up almost

anywhere the dynamics of the existing system permit. A significant section of that base has spent years training itself to see “fascism” in the period from 1919 to 1923, so it can use that as a foothold for the agreement now reached with the AKP. The rest will not trouble them much either. So long as someone treats them as a legitimate interlocutor. Then... then reality asserts itself, and new paths emerge on a different terrain.

For the AKP and MHP¹, meanwhile, this amounts to an outright “success”. For now... A “success” because Neo-Ottomanism is replacing the exhausted Turkish-Islamic synthesis and becoming the official ideology of capitalism in Turkey, and for the first time it has achieved such genuine alignment at national, regional and international level.

Around ten years ago, Neo-Ottomanism ran headlong into a wall in Syria. Syria has also become the first testing ground for its new incarnation. Turkey joined the United States, Britain, Israel and Qatar in bringing about regime change in Syria. Yet if it wants to maintain a presence there while remaining aligned with a United States that has countless other problems, it needs the country’s Sunni communities to

come together within a tribal order and an Arabo-Kurdish alliance to emerge from that arrangement.

The fact that Syria has become an arena of rivalry between Israel and Turkey represents only one side of the coin. On the other side lies a partnership between the two countries. Sometimes the Americans can broker that partnership, sometimes the British. And the region still contains plenty of issues that they need to “resolve” together. Let us not forget that those who won in Syria have yet to win in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and, of course, Iran.

The PKK’s change of format therefore offers the government a major opportunity. Some of those who have now embraced the peace process have swallowed the phrase they once repeated endlessly, “you do not negotiate with terrorists”, because they can smell the prospect of a “strong Turkey” stretching from Syria to Iraq. There is now a Grey Wolf at the den of wolves!²

The domestic political gain matters just as much to the AKP and MHP. With an economy like this, the “new peace process” may well offer their only route to another election victory. But the real objective is to paralyze the Republican resistance that they have

failed to break for twenty-five years. That would allow them to move from being a “destructive” force to a “founding” one. A new constitution would provide the deed to seal it. Unfortunately, the “Kurdish question” remains the weakest point of the Republican resistance. A few years ago, when we took the initiative to strengthen ties among Republicans, we said, among other things, that we would fight anti-Kurdish sentiment within Republican ranks. We came under fire for saying so. We were trying to explain that you cannot defend the values of the Republic by pretending the “Kurdish question” does not exist and parroting the language of the state in the 1980s.

The AKP spotted this weakness and exploited it all too well. What was the story? The Republic had supposedly shut Islamists and Kurds out, and now they would finally put that historical wrong right. The only way the Republican tradition could stand against that story was to reconsider the entire journey after 1919 through the lens of class. For those who could not do that, the road has now run out. A Republicanism that does not reinforce itself with egalitarianism has only two options left. It can take the “strong Turkey” part of the Neo-Ottoman project and stop worrying

about the rest, or it can settle into the ranks of the “Turkist reserve forces” that the system will call on whenever it needs them.

And the “left”, of course, will keep quiet. They got a little confused, but never mind. They keep the game going on one side by endlessly chanting about the “Palace regime”³, while on the other they refuse to budge an inch from the absolute obedience they have somehow extracted from the principle of “the right of nations to self-determination”. Once the Kurdish people had determined their own fate, they could turn their attention to other matters. And they knew perfectly well that the Kurdish people had handed that right over to the PKK, and the PKK had handed it over to Öcalan.

When Öcalan then opted for the AKP’s Neo-Ottoman strategy, the “left” felt a little pang inside, but what could they do? By then, the “left” had spent years becoming expert political operators. As the “forces of democracy”, they could follow Özel and İmamoğlu on one side, while as the “forces of freedom” they followed Öcalan on the other. By bringing these two lines of struggle closer together, they could still imagine themselves playing a perfectly “revolutionary” role.

Life has carried them from hostility towards the Republic of Turkey to a point where they cannot bring themselves to object to an imperial project. Such a shame...

Can they escape this trap? Over the past twenty-five years they have had plenty of chances to find a way out, and they failed to take them. If they manage it now, we shall see...

What matters now is what we do in a process that still remains far from complete. Our position is clear. Peace is good. Fraternity is good. So, we are not going to claim that this process offers no benefit whatsoever.

But we oppose it. We do not oppose it from the same standpoint as those who rage, "How can you sit down with terrorists?", taking the easy way out. Nor do we oppose it like the foolish "leftists" who, nostalgic for the earlier aims of the "Kurdish freedom movement", say "yes, but not enough".

Something new has emerged. And this new situation requires us to prepare working people urgently for the major shocks that the reckless and ambitious Neo-Ottoman project will bring, by rallying them around a concrete programme of liberation and reconstruction.

When the Republic of Turkey set itself on the path of capitalist development in 1923, it held on to the anchor of “Soviet friendship”, which helped prevent major upheavals and threats. That friendship faded over time, but it helped shield the Republic of Turkey from imperialist partition.

The process we have now entered offers no such anchor, only international allies who cannot under any circumstance command our trust. They want to tie Turkey to something, and the leadership taking shape around this project consists of Erdoğan, Bahçeli and Öcalan. Anyone who wishes may compare them with the cadres who came to the fore during the revolutionary transformations of the 1920s.

This will not produce stability. Nor will it produce a new “Turkey”.

The issue moved beyond “who should our presidential candidate be?” long ago. The same goes for talk of Turkey moving a little closer to the “Global South” in international affairs... Getting stuck on questions like these reflects an inability to diagnose what is actually happening.



Neo-Ottomanism has now become the fate of Turkish capitalism. With or without this process.

And this is a fact that all should bear in mind.

But capitalism is not Turkey's fate. It is time this was understood.

- 1- The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) is a fascist party and the junior partner in government through its alliance with the AKP under the name People's Alliance. Its leader, Devlet Bahçeli, has played a leading role in the new "peace process" from the outset.
- 2- "Den of wolves", is an expression for a political or social arena where powerful actors engage in a ruthless struggle for power and competing interests. The bozkurt, or Grey Wolf, is an established symbol of Turkish nationalism, particularly the fascist movement. Okuyan combines the two meanings here in a play on words, referring both to Turkey's attempt to become a more assertive actor in regional struggles where imperialist powers dominate and to the nationalist and fascist element within that strategy.
- 3- Opposition circles in Turkey widely use the term "Palace regime" to criticise the AKP government and, in particular, the system of rule that increasingly centres power on President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. "Palace" refers to the Presidential Complex in Ankara. At the same time, the term tends to reduce Turkey's political and social problems largely to the current government and its leader, obscuring their structural connection to Turkish capitalism and the interests of the capitalist class.



From the October Revolution to Anatolia: **The founding of the Communist Party of Turkey**

This year, the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) celebrates the 106th anniversary of its foundation. Over the course of its 106-year history, the Party has witnessed major struggles, ruptures and advances, periods of retreat under the pressure of the ruling system, and renewed breakthroughs. It was forced to spend much of its history struggling under illegal conditions.

Today, as a party that intervenes in the country's political agenda with growing influence, carrying the voice of communism

to every corner of the country and putting down ever deeper roots, the TKP has never abandoned the goal with which it was founded: to lead the country towards socialism. Despite the many ups and downs in the Party's history, the internationalist and patriotic character that took shape at its foundation represents a remarkable thread of continuity.

To understand this continuity, in this article we look back at the foundation of the TKP and the principles on which it was founded.

Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) was founded in Baku on 10 September 1920. Yet to regard this date merely as the founding day of a political party would be to overlook much of the significance of what was taking place in Baku at the time. TKP emerged at an extraordinary historical moment, when the old empires were disintegrating in the aftermath of the First World War, the upheaval unleashed by the October Revolution was reverberating far beyond Russia's borders, and colonised peoples from Asia to Africa were rising up against imperialist domination.

The October Revolution of 1917 had transformed the political map of the world. For the

Bolsheviks, revolution was no longer a matter concerning only the working class of Europe's advanced capitalist countries. New links were being forged between the struggles of workers and peasants in countries colonised or reduced to semi-colonial status by imperialism and the socialist revolution. The Soviet government's policy towards the oppressed peoples of the former Tsarist territories also sent a powerful message to the rising anti-imperialist movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries.

Baku in the summer of 1920 was one of the most vibrant centres of this quest. Soviet power had been established in Azerbaijan only a few months earlier, and the Red Army had pushed back the counter-revolutionary forces in the Caucasus. Yet the war was far from over, and the future of the region remained uncertain. For the Bolsheviks, halting imperialism in Anatolia was also of vital importance to the security of Soviet Russia; they believed that a victory against imperialism in Turkey could set an example for the entire East.

The first Congress of the Peoples of the East and the foundation of TKP

It was under these circumstances that the Communist International convened the First



Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku from 1 to 7 September 1920. Its aim was to bring together, on a common terrain of struggle, the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist forces gaining momentum under the impact of the October Revolution. The Congress did not develop into a permanent "Eastern International"; yet the tone of the speeches and the atmosphere generated by the delegates were powerful enough to transcend the limits of the tactical gathering initially envisaged by the Bolsheviki. In Baku, an ideologically heterogeneous but highly enthusiastic movement had created something of the atmosphere of an "Eastern International."

The composition of the Congress itself reflected this atmosphere. Alongside representatives of the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia,

Arab, Kurdish, Indian, Chinese, and Korean delegates were also present in Baku. Turkey, meanwhile, was represented by one of the largest delegations at the Congress, a fact that carried political significance. In Anatolia, an armed struggle against imperialist occupation was under way, while the social and political direction in which this struggle would ultimately develop had yet to be determined.

The Turkish delegation in Baku was itself a microcosm of this uncertainty. Alongside the communists, Kemalist and Unionist nationalists had also come to the Congress. The Ankara government had not sent an official delegation, instead appointing İbrahim Tali Bey, the representative of the Grand National Assembly (BMM) in Moscow, to attend as an observer. Even more striking was the presence of Enver Pasha, the prominent Ottoman Minister of War during the First World War, now living in exile, who attended the Congress as a representative of revolutionaries from Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Tripolitania. Meanwhile, Grigori Zinoviev, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, openly stated from the rostrum that they were well aware that Mustafa Kemal – the leader of the National Movement in Anatolia was not a communist, while nevertheless declaring their support for the struggle in Anatolia.

TKP was founded in the very midst of this political ferment.

Moreover, the fact that the Congress of the Peoples of the East and TKP's founding congress were held within days of each other was no coincidence. The First Congress of the Communist Organisations of Turkey had originally been scheduled to convene on 1 September but was postponed when the Congress of the Peoples of the East was set for the same dates. At the Comintern's request, the Communist Organisation of Turkey also took part in organising the Congress and worked to bring delegates from Turkey to Baku. According to figures provided by TKP's founding leader, Mustafa Suphi, in addition to the group of 40–50 people assembled by the Ankara government, 51 delegates from Turkey reached Baku through the efforts of the communists. Mustafa Suphi himself took part in the Congress's preparatory meetings and served on its presidium.

The fact that TKP's founding congress was subsequently held with the support of the Council for Propaganda and Action of the Peoples of the East, established immediately after the Congress, further demonstrated the organisational links between the two processes.

Foundational programme of TKP

The task facing the congress that convened on 10 September was not simply to give a name to a new party. Communist organisations that had emerged under different conditions in Russia, İstanbul, and various parts of Anatolia had to be brought together under a single organisation, political and ideological unity had to be established, a programme drawn up, and a common course of struggle defined. TKP was being founded as a party that had emerged from the October Revolution and, from the outset, regarded itself as an integral part of the Communist International. The adoption of the conditions for membership laid down at the Comintern's Second Congress was also on the agenda of the founding congress.

The founding congress also adopted TKP's first programme, setting out its vision for the future of Turkey. The "Programme of the Communist Party of Turkey" consisted of fourteen sections, preceded by a ten-point introduction entitled "Certain Principles and Fundamentals." The programme approached the development of capitalism, monopolisation, and imperialist repartition within a Marxist framework, while viewing the revolutionary processes in East and West as complementary movements. Turkey, meanwhile, was characterised as a country

with limited industrialisation and without a well-established and powerful proletariat, but with hundreds of thousands of workers, poor peasants, the unemployed, and working people who had endured the devastation of war. TKP defined itself as a party of “workers and peasants” and a member of the Third International and set as its political objective a “Republic of Workers’ and Peasants’ Councils.”

A striking feature of the programme was its attempt to combine a general perspective of socialist transformation with the concrete conditions of Turkey. It envisaged the socialisation of large enterprises, the organisation of small producers into cooperatives and, in certain cases, the redistribution of land to landless peasants; it also advocated the nationalisation of banks, the establishment of a People’s Bank, and the taxation of large fortunes. In the sphere of workers’ rights, it put forward demands such as the eight-hour working day, the prohibition of child labour, paid maternity leave for women, and paid annual leave for all workers. It also envisaged comprehensive social policies, including equal and free healthcare, compulsory education for both girls and boys, public schools, libraries, and childcare institutions.

Participating in the “National Struggle”

Being founded in Baku did not mean that TKP stood apart from Turkey. On the contrary, TKP was composed of cadres who understood the vital importance of victory in the National Struggle in Anatolia and regarded strengthening the War of Independence as their immediate priority. Even before the party was founded, its organisational efforts had already been directed towards Anatolia. Communists from Turkey living in Russia had been sent to İstanbul, where they began organising. Following the formal occupation of İstanbul by the Allied Powers in March 1920, some of these cadres were arrested, some returned to Baku, while others made their way to Anatolia and attempted to organise in various cities. In the summer of 1920, around thirty propagandists were sent to Anatolia and the Black Sea coast, and communist cells emerged in ports such as Trabzon, Rize, Zonguldak, and Ereğli, establishing links with Soviet Russia.

For this reason, it would be more accurate to view Baku not as an “exile centre” detached from Turkey, but as a temporary base for revolutionary activity directed towards Anatolia. The party’s aim was to return to Turkey at the earliest opportunity, take part in the struggle against imperialist occupation, and at the same

time organise workers and peasants around an independent class politics.

This programmatic framework also shaped TKP's approach to the National Struggle in Anatolia. The party maintained that the struggle in Anatolia was being waged "against world imperialism as a whole" and therefore contributed to the international proletarian movement. But it did not stop there. TKP believed that the further development of the national movement would create favourable conditions for the growth of class consciousness; while helping to advance the struggle against imperialism, it also saw it as its task to prepare the conditions for the rule of "peasants and workers." National liberation and social liberation were not alternatives, but two struggles that had to be linked together.

This approach did not remain merely a theoretical formula. One of the figures who came from Anatolia to attend the Congress was Cevat Bey, associated with the circle around the Albayrak newspaper in Erzurum and sent to Baku by Kâzım Karabekir— prominent commander of the National Struggle in the Eastern part of the country. Although Cevat Bey spoke of the popular character of the Ankara government, he also stated that the people of Anatolia did not regard the existing government as their "ultimate

ideal government” and looked to the revolution in Russia for support. This was one indication of the links that communists were beginning to establish with local intellectual circles in Anatolia that were turning towards socialism.

Thus, from the very first day of its founding in Baku on 10 September 1920, TKP had set its sights on Anatolia. After the founding congress, the question was not whether to go to Turkey, but when and how. A few months later, this decision was put into practice. Mustafa Suphi and his comrades left Baku by train on 19 December 1920. The first group travelled together with a Soviet diplomatic delegation and arrived in Kars on 28 December.

Their entry into Anatolia, however, did not mark the beginning of the political activity they had anticipated. Along their route from Erzurum to Trabzon, they faced organised attacks supported by central and local authorities. When they reached Trabzon on the night of 28 January 1921, they were taken to the harbour and forced aboard a boat that had been prepared in advance. Mustafa Suphi and fourteen of his comrades were murdered in the Black Sea. The massacre marked a tragic beginning for TKP and, compounded by the state repression it faced in the years that followed, necessitated a long and difficult process of rebuilding.

Thus, the first chapter in TKP's history unfolded in just four and a half months, stretching from Baku to the waters off Trabzon. Yet this brief trajectory also brought into sharp relief the fundamental political aspiration on which the party had been founded: to be part of the international revolutionary wave unleashed by the October Revolution, to join the struggle against imperialism in Anatolia, and, within that struggle, to build an independent socialist organisation of Turkey's workers and peasants.



Communists and the struggle for peace

Murat Akad,

Member of TKP Party Council

The world is moving in a direction in which imperialism is escalating international tensions. This escalation is increasing the likelihood of war, perhaps even nuclear war. Humanity is facing a genuine and immediate threat.

In this conjuncture, one of the principal tasks of communists around the world is to wage a determined struggle for peace. The struggle for peace has been an important component of the international communist movement since its inception. At the same time, particularly following the demise of the real existing

socialism, certain currents within the peace movement moved towards a more liberal orientation and lost sight of their original focus.

Communists have remained committed to their principles and continued this tradition. Nevertheless, more needs to be done to strengthen the influence and weight of this principled struggle.

In order to make a sound assessment of the international situation and pave the way towards a just and sustainable peace, it is necessary to establish the fundamentals of imperialism. Imperialism is the highest and final stage of capitalism. It is not a temporary policy adopted by capitalism, nor a reversible mistake. Capitalism will not pass into another stage within the framework of capitalism itself.

The struggle against imperialism cannot be separated from the struggle against capitalism. These two phenomena cannot be assessed independently of one another. The anti-imperialist struggle must have an anti-capitalist character.

The global imperialist system is characterised by relations of hegemony and domination. Analysing the system and its functioning as a whole will help us understand the relations between

countries occupying different positions within its hierarchy and how these countries are integrated into the system. This, in turn, would help peace movements in these countries formulate concrete objectives.

An imperialist country has the ability to influence the economic, political, military, ideological and cultural dynamics of other countries. The tendency to establish such relations, however, is not the same as the concrete ability to do so. The latter is the valid criterion for defining a country as imperialist. Therefore, determining whether a country is imperialist requires concrete analysis and a political perspective.

Imperialism has been experiencing a crisis of hegemony for a long time. Following the demise of socialist power in the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, the United States and its allies expanded their hegemonic reach considerably, particularly during the 1990s and early 2000s. In subsequent years, however, the balance began to shift. On the one hand, the United States began experiencing economic difficulties; on the other, China emerged as a political and economic power, while Russia, despite greater economic turbulence, re-emerged as a significant political power, challenging US hegemony. The failures of



imperialist policies, particularly in Syria and elsewhere, further contributed to this process. The United States responded by escalating tensions. What we are witnessing in the Middle East, Latin America and elsewhere is a consequence of this escalation.

The fact that the United States has led the imperialist system for a long period does not mean that this position is permanent. Competition and contradictions within the system have the potential to produce changes at every level of the hierarchy, including at the top. The functioning of the system does not automatically mean that such changes will favour peace. The dynamics undermining US hegemony do not necessarily set in motion developments conducive to peace.

The fact that certain countries challenge the existing hierarchy and produce disruptive

effects does not necessarily generate positive outcomes for peace. The capitalist character of these countries must never be overlooked. In other words, the world may become multipolar, but unless capitalism itself is overthrown, this development will not bring humanity closer to peace.

Ultimately, achieving a lasting peace requires overcoming capitalism. But this certainly does not mean that the struggle for peace should be abandoned or postponed. A persistent struggle for peace can reduce the scale of destruction resulting from wars. It can also undermine the cohesion and stability of capitalism and imperialism.

First and foremost, it is necessary to clearly analyse the class character of current and future conflicts. As we have witnessed in numerous cases over the decades, nationalist sentiments are relentlessly imposed upon working people in order to prepare the ground for mass militarisation. A correct analysis of conflicts will enable the communist movement to bring their class character to the fore and reinforce this understanding with the ideas necessary to prevent nationalism from overwhelming class consciousness.

This will also enable communists to take clear and principled positions without taking sides between different capitalist classes.

We must explain to the peoples of the world that any general war would have devastating consequences for humanity on an unprecedented scale. Under current conditions, it is clear that nuclear weapons could be used in such a general war.

The foremost task of communists is to prevent a general war from taking place. War must be prevented at all costs. The destruction caused by war would fall particularly heavily on the working class and other impoverished sections of society. At the same time, the policy that should be pursued if war breaks out should also be indicated. If war nevertheless breaks out, intervention must be undertaken to bring it to an end as quickly as possible. And furthermore, the collapse of capitalism must be accelerated through persistent struggle.

The First World War gave rise to important debates during the early development of the peace movement. Lenin and the Bolsheviks opposed pacifism—that is, an abstract advocacy of peace—and stressed that it served no purpose other than deceiving the working class. At the Conference of the Russian Social

Democratic Labour Party, held in Bern from 27 February to 4 March 1915, Lenin stated: "Today, peace propaganda that is not accompanied by a call for revolutionary mass action merely causes the proletariat to indulge in illusions and become demoralised, turning it into a plaything in the hands of the secret diplomacy pursued by the warring countries." According to Lenin, it was also demonstrated that the ruling class's fear that a proletarian revolution might emerge as a result of a world war constituted a vital guarantee of peace.

The essence of calls for peace should be to make clear to the masses the distinction between socialism and capitalism, rather than attempting to reconcile two hostile classes or two antagonistic political lines.

The guarantee of peace is the organised and conscious movement of the working class.



The new tool of imperialism in the Middle East design: Mecca Agreement

Ayhan Keser,
Member of TKP Party Council

Many news articles and commentaries have been written about the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement (Mecca Agreement), signed on August 7, 2026, between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. To prevent the exaggerations and contradictions in these comments from obscuring the significance of the development, they need to be examined more closely.

First of all, the Mecca Agreement carries a potential for military aggression that should not

be underestimated. However, the claim, widely promoted by Turkey's pro-AKP press, that the combination of "Saudi money, Turkish troops, and Pakistani nuclear weapons" has created an alliance capable of dominating the region is an exaggeration. The alliance has regional rivals, while the US and the UK continue to hold the reins in the region—and even those in control cannot always make events unfold as they wish.

To understand the basis of the Agreement, it is therefore worth first examining some of the assessments that have been made.

Is an Islamic NATO emerging?

The first comments following the announcement of the Agreement suggested that it amounted to a kind of "Islamic NATO." The fact that the Agreement adopts an approach similar to NATO's Article 5 certainly contributed to this comparison. More importantly, however, the reactionary governments of the region tend to portray NATO as an exemplary "defence" organization and present it to their peoples as a model to be followed. Yet NATO is neither a defence organization, nor are these three countries the protectors of the "Islamic ummah".

Although negotiations for the Agreement lasted nearly two years, its provisions are broadly in line

with the strategic decisions discussed at the latest NATO meeting held in Turkey. This parallel becomes even more significant when considered alongside NATO's decision to establish the NATO Multinational Corps Headquarters (MNC-TUR) in Adana, aimed at strengthening its presence in Turkey and extending its influence across the region.

From this perspective, it may be more accurate to describe the Mecca Agreement not as an "Islamic NATO", but as part of NATO's expansion into the Islamic world.

Is an unrivaled regional power emerging?

The answer to this question is, of course, no.

The Israel-United Arab Emirates-India trio represents another alliance with regional ambitions. Considering the I2U2 group, which also includes the United States, the Mecca Agreement can be seen as an attempt to carve out a space in the region rather than leave the field to its rivals.

The agreement brings together three nations with a majority of Sunni Muslims. The emerging so-called "Sunni Axis" also reflects efforts to fill the vacuum created by Iran's weakening influence and to secure a stronger position in the ongoing restructuring of the Middle East.

Is a security mechanism beyond the US being sought?

Another widely discussed issue concerns the effects of the US/Israel-Iran war. Iran, itself a target of imperialist aggression, struck US facilities in nine countries in the region, fueling debate over Washington's inability to protect its allies. Iranian officials reinforced this perception by warning regional countries against relying on the US for their security.

The Mecca Agreement was therefore interpreted as evidence that regional countries had recognized the limits of US security guarantees and were exploring alternatives. Some even argued that Turkey's military combined with Pakistan's nuclear weapons could provide a more effective defence shield.

Interestingly, the Chinese press promoted a similar interpretation, though for different reasons, welcoming the search for security mechanisms independent of the US. In Turkey, meanwhile, this argument fed claims to regional leadership: "we can do what the US could not."

The crisis of hegemony and competition

This brings us to the heart of the matter: Amid the continuing crisis of hegemony within the

imperialist-capitalist hierarchy, US imperialism wants to “deal with” Russia and the Middle East so it can focus on China, while massive military budgets continue to pave the way for new wars around the world.

This crisis of hegemony, the capitalist competition it has triggered, and the military build-up provide the context in which the Mecca Agreement has taken shape. Although such military alliances are presented to domestic publics in terms of security, their real purpose is to expand the room for capitalist classes in pursuit of ever greater resources.

In times of crisis, more countries seek to secure a larger share, and military build-up and war increasingly become the means of gaining the upper hand.

Can Turkish capitalism win?

Taken on its own, the Agreement may not seem particularly significant. However, as we have long emphasized, the Turkish bourgeoisie seeks to expand and climb higher in the imperialist hierarchy. This also underlies many recent steps, including the “peace process,” currently entering an intense phase.

Some see the Mecca Agreement as a “good move” within a neo-Ottomanist strategy that also includes the Kurds. Yet this optimism overlooks the intensity of regional competition.

The region is undergoing imperialist restructuring, and Turkey wants to win the contract, but it is not alone at the table. The US and UK need not take sides: competing power centers and their growing rivalries create opportunities for them, particularly as regional “actors” seek to position themselves within US-UK plans rather than pursue independent strategies.

Turkey’s efforts to reduce Iran’s influence also raise an obvious question: who benefits most from the resulting vacuum? While claiming to stand against Israel, Turkey is in fact playing into Israel’s hands.

Does the Mecca Agreement provide security?

Military alliances, increased military spending, and taking on roles in imperialist plans do not provide security. They serve to present the expansionist ambitions of the capitalists as the national interest while boosting the profits of arms companies.

Recent developments illustrate the risks for millions of working people in Turkey and the region: the Red Sea Coalition is preparing to escalate the war against the Houthis in Yemen; PKK leader Öcalan and various DEM Party officials have targeted Iran; and Israel has struck the Abu al-Zuhur Air Base near the Turkish border, openly declaring that it was sending a message to Turkey.

The picture is clear: Turkish capitalism is moving towards new areas of conflict rather than greater security. Such military alliances also risk dragging Turkey into wars through provocations beyond its control.

If security is the goal, the way forward is not to tie Turkey to imperialist plans through military alliances, but to withdraw from NATO and other imperialist agreements and establish relations based on equality with all countries, starting with its neighbors.



The sect-corporate complex: **The Süleymanists and their** **relations with the German state**

Büşra Çakmak,

Member of TKP Party Council

Last month, the AKP government's operations against the Süleymanists sect escalated into a crackdown with international ramifications. State trustees were appointed to more than thirty companies linked to the organization, while 49 people, including its leader Alihan Kuriş, were detained, primarily on money-laundering charges.

The Süleymanists are merely one of dozens of religious sects and orders that have grown

increasingly powerful under the AKP, extending their influence into public institutions.

These already well-established religious orders also benefited from the purge of the Fethullah Gülen network¹, moving into vacated positions and further expanding their influence within the state, while their political and economic networks extend well beyond Turkey.

While the Gülen movement's domestic network has been largely dismantled, it continues to operate abroad, particularly in Germany. The Süleymanists, too, have built an extensive network there.

As their numbers and networks grow, competition among these religious orders intensifies. Funding such sprawling organizations requires far more than voluntary donations from devout followers. This is where what the TKP defines as the "sect-corporate complex" comes into play.

Cadres who double as businesspeople participate in and award public contracts, allowing unaccounted-for money to be laundered into the economy or stockpiled as gold bullion in homes. Political connections turn into money, and money into politics, creating a self-perpetuating cycle.

At the same time, AKP figures continue to appear in Süleymanist mosques, conveying the message: “We have no issue with sects as such.” While a handful of figures are targeted for financial corruption, relations with the community itself continue.

If the AKP is not opposed to religious orders as such, what lies behind its campaign against the Süleymanists?

The tension between the AKP and the Süleymanists is not a recent development. It intensified after the sect backed Ekrem İmamoğlu² in the 2019 local elections and maintained this stance in subsequent elections. The AKP responded with measures including the demolition of a student dormitory closely associated with the sect. The conflict, which has manifested itself with varying intensity over the years, has ultimately culminated in the current crackdown.

The crackdown has also brought the Süleymanists’ extensive international connections into public view, particularly their strong ties with Germany.

Relations with the German state

Built upon explicit hostility towards the Republic and secularism, the sect’s European

arm operates under the Association of Islamic Cultural Centres (Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren – VIKZ). Its origins can be traced to the “Türkische Union,” founded in Cologne in 1967, and the Islamic Cultural Centre (IKZ) established in 1973. Operating under its current name since 1980, VIKZ is Germany’s longest-running Turkish-Muslim organization and ranks third in membership size.

The organization’s formal establishment in 1973 coincided with a significant moment for Turkish migrant labor in Germany. Just weeks earlier, predominantly Turkish workers had led the Ford strike in Cologne, one of the major events in the German labor movement. Against this background, the emergence of organizations established under the banner of Islam among the growing Turkish migrant population was hardly coincidental.

Information provided by the organization itself in early 1997 indicated that they managed over 300 branches across Germany and roughly 125 throughout the rest of Europe. Among the countries with particularly high numbers of branches were the Netherlands (28), Austria (34), and France (15). Another notable aspect during this period was that the group held direct real estate ownership over a significant portion of the branches in Germany.

Data from 1998 estimated the sect's membership in Germany at over 100,000. Contemporary sources recorded 160 mosques under its control, with a total European membership approaching 150,000. Today, however, it is not possible to obtain comparable and regularly updated data on membership numbers and overall organizational size for various reasons.

The sect's institutionalization extends far beyond places of worship and religious services. In 1985 and 1995, two additional associations affiliated with VIKZ were established. One of these is a "charitable organization" created to operate social service institutions such as dormitories, nursing homes, retirement homes, and daycare centers, while the other was designed to conduct educational activities for adults and their families. Organizing courses, seminars, and conferences was also among the activities of this organization.

In addition, a broad economic network emerged, ranging from the management of funeral funds and Hajj pilgrimage travel packages to various commercial enterprises. It is known that the company, founded in the 1970s under the name Merkez Handels GmbH, traded in meat, groceries, and food products. Later rebranded as Tuna Food GmbH, the enterprise expanded into halal meat processing, deli distribution, import-export, textile trading, and travel agency services.



Furthermore, since the 1980s, the community has been training its own imams in Germany. Young people instructed in local Quran courses are later sent to regional centers before completing their education at the Cologne headquarters. The organization has both volunteer and full-time, salaried clergy.

It is also known that the sect operates a large number of gender-segregated dormitories for students. In particular, practices at some of the girls' dormitories have been the subject of research and public debate at various times.

Evaluating all this data together makes clear that classifying the VKZ as a mere "religious community" is inadequate. What exists is a multi-layered institutional apparatus that spans from mosques to educational institutions,

from student dormitories to social service organizations, from funeral funds to commercial companies, and from Hajj organizations to a system for training religious officials. This structure also generates significant economic capacity.

VIKZ's institutional standing in Germany is also noteworthy in terms of its relationship with the state. The sect has held permanent membership in the German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islam Konferenz), which Germany has organized since 2006. This reflects the fact that the German state recognizes the VIKZ not merely as a religious community, but as an official representative body for the Muslim population in Germany.

In recent years, VIKZ's new multipurpose complex in Cologne has highlighted the community's economic and institutional capacity. Reportedly costing around 70 million euros and including conference halls, student dormitories and imam training facilities, the complex demonstrates the considerable financial resources and organizational capacity at the order's disposal.

VIKZ celebrated its 50th anniversary in Cologne in 2023, with German Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier attending the ceremony. Praising the organization, Steinmeier stated: "The VIKZ impressively demonstrates that religious

self-containment and service to society are not mutually exclusive. [...] They show that religions can be unifying, even beyond one's own faith."

The German state's interest in religious orders is neither new nor limited to the Süleymanists. From the arrival of the first Gastarbeiter ("guest workers"), migrant workers were deliberately kept separate from society, hindering their organization in the workplace. Once it became clear that they were there to stay, "integration" emerged alongside attempts to develop a "German Islam." Religious structures proved useful instruments for managing this population: even an order like the Süleymanists, representing only a fraction of Muslims in Germany, could be treated as an interlocutor for Turkish Muslims, allowing the state to deal with a handful of religious organizations as representatives of a supposedly homogeneous Muslim community.

For the German state, then, the Süleymanists are not "dangerous"; they are "manageable." Rather than being treated as a threat by the German security apparatus, they have for decades been allowed to quietly institutionalize themselves, building schools, dormitories and companies while becoming an official interlocutor of the state through associations recognized as serving the "public benefit."

What matters to the capitalist system is not the reactionary ideas instilled in children and young people, the misogyny reproduced within these institutions, or the community's orientation towards sharia, but the existence of an organized and predictable structure that can be useful when necessary. Nor is this relationship one-sided: since the Cold War, religious organizations mobilized to unite Muslims against communism have served both to keep immigrant populations under control domestically and, when necessary, as instruments of influence abroad.

What we have, then, is a pragmatic relationship based on mutual interests—one that nevertheless remains fragile enough to collapse the moment those interests cease to align.

1- Fetullah Gülen was the leader of the Gülen Movement. For details about Fetullah Gülen and his movement see the August 2026 issue of Voice of TKP.

2- Ekrem İmamoğlu, the İstanbul Metropolitan Mayor (İBB) from the Republican People's Party (CHP), was detained on 19 March 2025 as part of a corruption investigation into the İBB and was subsequently arrested. For details see the April 2025 issue of Voice of TKP.

Religious Orders and Sects in Turkey

30 RELIGIOUS ORDERS, **400**



According to a 2018 field study, there are approximately 30 major religious orders and around 400 affiliated branches or religious communities operating in Turkey. The study estimated that more than 2.6 million people have organic ties to religious orders or communities.

The Naqshbandi tradition is generally considered one of the largest and most

influential religious networks in Turkey. The Menzil, İsmailağa and İskenderpaşa communities are commonly associated with the Naqshbandi tradition. The Süleymanist movement also has historical connections with broader Sunni traditions.

The Nur movement, inspired by the teachings of Said Nursi, has also fragmented into numerous separate communities and groups.

1/3 LINKED TO RELIGIOUS ORDERS OR COMMUNITIES



According to a 2018 study, one-third of Turkey's 10,053 private educational institutions were linked to a religious order or community, with around 210,000 students attending such schools and institutions,

excluding universities. The study also reported that 2,480 of the more than 4,000 private student dormitories in the country were affiliated with religious orders or communities.

The study further reported that 445 tekkes in İstanbul were openly operating. It identified more than 800 active madrasas, concentrated in İstanbul and a number of eastern and southeastern provinces, including Siirt, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Adıyaman, Batman, Van, Hakkâri, Şırnak, Ağrı, Muş, Bitlis, Gaziantep and Şanlıurfa. According to the study, the number of madrasas in urban centres had increased rapidly during the AKP period, while in eastern and southeastern Turkey, Qur'an courses were increasingly being operated under the umbrella of associations.

REPLACEMENT OF GÜLENIST NETWORKS

Following the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, the extensive purge of people associated with the Gülen movement from the state apparatus created large numbers of vacancies in public institutions.



People associated with other religious orders and communities filled many of these positions. Menzil, İskenderpaşa, İsmailağa and various Nur communities have, in particular, been reported as having gained influence in key state institutions. Their influence has been reported in institutions including the Ministries of Health, Education and Interior, as well as the police, military, gendarmerie and judiciary.

Mustafa Suphi, founding leader of TKP:

A life transformed by Revolution



Mustafa Suphi's short life bore the imprint of the great upheavals that swept across the vast geography stretching from the Ottoman Empire to Russia, and from the Caucasus to Anatolia, in the first quarter of the twentieth century. His political journey began as a young Ottoman intellectual influenced by nationalist ideas, but war and exile would lead him towards the

October Revolution, Bolshevism, and ultimately the founding of the Communist Party of Turkey. This transformation amounted to far more than a change in one man's political convictions. In Suphi's life, the internationalism of the October Revolution converged with the working class patriotism of Anatolia fighting against imperialist occupation. That convergence would become one of the defining elements of the political identity of TKP, the party he founded.

Born in Giresun in 1882, Suphi was a well-educated Ottoman intellectual. After completing his studies in İstanbul, he went to Paris, where he studied at the École libre des sciences politiques and earned his doctorate with a dissertation on agricultural credit. Although his years in Europe brought him into contact with socialist thought, he was not yet a Marxist. Upon returning to İstanbul, he taught political economy, worked as a journalist, and became actively involved in the political debates of the day.

From exile to revolution

The first major rupture that would alter the course of his life came in 1913. Following the assassination of Mahmut Şevket Pasha in 1913, the Committee of Union and Progress launched a crackdown on its political opponents. Mustafa

Suphi was arrested as part of this campaign and subsequently exiled to Sinop. Sentenced to internal exile in this town, he was not kept behind prison walls: he was allowed to move about the town, but was required to report regularly to the police station and sign in. In May 1914, he escaped from Sinop with a group of fellow exiles in a small boat. Out on the Black Sea, they boarded a Russian vessel, which carried them to Yalta.

The years in Russia that began in this way brought Suphi face to face with an entirely different world. When the First World War broke out a few months later, he was arrested as an Ottoman citizen and sent into the Russian interior. The time he spent there among prisoners of war and workers proved decisive in his political transformation. As he would later recount, workers, soldiers, and intellectuals from Turkey who had been swept into Russia found themselves working alongside Russian labourers in factories and on the railways, experiencing at first hand the consequences of war and capitalism. It was in this environment that Suphi's ties with the Bolsheviks began to develop.

The revolutions of 1917 accelerated this transformation. Suphi was no longer an

Ottoman intellectual with an interest in socialism, but a communist organiser actively engaged in the revolutionary process. Following the October Revolution, he served in the Central Muslim Commissariat under the People's Commissariat for Nationalities in Moscow, where he took on responsibilities in international propaganda work. By this point, Suphi was no longer a revolutionary concerned with Turkey alone: his attention extended to the problems facing revolutionary movements across a vast geography, from the Muslim peoples of Russia to Iran, Afghanistan, and India. Yet Turkey never fell outside this horizon. One of the most tangible expressions of Suphi's continuing engagement with his country was the newspaper *Yeni Dünya* (New World). Through this Turkish-language paper, he introduced prisoners of war and workers from Turkey living in Russia to the October Revolution, Marxism, and Bolshevik policies. *Yeni Dünya* was more than a publishing venture; it became an instrument of organisation around which a new generation of communist cadres began to take shape. The sheer intensity of Suphi's activity during the last few years of his life was remarkable: across a vast geography stretching from Kazan to Moscow, and from Crimea to Turkestan and Baku, he published



and organised, worked among prisoners of war, helped build communist organisations, and took part in the activities of the Communist International.

This was also one of the qualities singled out by Sultan Galiyev, a prominent Tatar Bolshevik and one of the best-known communist figures to emerge from the Muslim world in this period, who had known Suphi closely, in a portrait written shortly after his death: Suphi's revolutionary commitment was never confined to desk work or intellectual activity; it constantly drew him towards organising and working among the masses. In Suphi's own words, the point was to take part in the revolution not merely through "life and literature," but through "action and organisation."¹

The road to Anatolia

This intense internationalist experience did not distance Suphi from Turkey; on the contrary,

it increasingly turned his attention towards Anatolia. He saw the National Struggle against imperialist occupation as part of the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle. Yet his patriotism was not synonymous with nationalism. He advocated organising Turkish, Kurdish, Greek, and Armenian working people around their common class interests, beyond nationalist divisions, and sought to link Anatolia's liberation from imperialism with the social emancipation of workers and peasants.

It was perhaps precisely this convergence that gave Mustafa Suphi's political journey, culminating in the founding of TKP in 1920, its distinctive character. On the one hand stood the internationalist horizon opened up by the October Revolution; on the other, the struggle for the independence of his own country under imperialist occupation. Suphi did not choose one over the other. He sought to conceive of both as integral parts of the same revolutionary strategy.

He was given almost no opportunity, however, to put this strategy to the test in Turkey. Shortly after returning to Anatolia, in January 1921, Mustafa Suphi was killed together with fourteen of his comrades off the coast of Trabzon. He was only thirty-eight. His death deprived the

communist movement in Turkey not only of its founding leader, but also of a prolific and incisive writer and a revolutionary who, in the space of just a few years, had become a remarkably experienced organiser.

What remained was a political legacy that would outlive his short life: the endeavour to unite the internationalism of the October Revolution with the anti-imperialist patriotism of Anatolia, and the struggle for the country's independence with the struggle for the emancipation of its working people. This synthesis transcended Mustafa Suphi's individual story and became one of the constitutive elements of TKP's political identity.

1- S. Galiyev, *"Mustafa Suphi ve Eseri"* [*"Mustafa Suphi and His Work"*], *Gelenek*, no. 129, January 2016

Highlights from Turkish Foreign Policy



Israel's "Message" to Turkey through Syria

In the lead-up to and aftermath of Israel's attack on a Syrian airbase, intense diplomatic and military exchanges took place between Turkey, Syria, Israel and the US. Prior to the attack, meetings between Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad and US Representative Tom Barrack, as well as between Al Shaibani and Mossad Director Roman Gofman, attracted attention, as did Erdoğan's contacts with Trump and British officials.

While Israel presented the attack as a warning against a potential Turkish military presence in Syria, Al Shaibani claimed that Turkey had no intention of establishing a permanent base or deploying troops. Ankara also stated that there was no Turkish military delegation in the region

at the time of the attack and announced that Turkey would continue to support Syria's efforts to develop its military capabilities.

Amidst the heightened tensions, the increased activity of the Turkish navy in the Eastern Mediterranean and Israel's plans to expand its fleet suggested that the conflict was taking on a maritime dimension. Meanwhile, the US announced that it was holding 'quiet talks' with Turkey, Israel and Syria to establish a de-escalation mechanism. More broadly, the US is seeking to position Turkey as a cooperative regional actor that can help maintain the balance against Iran and share the burden, while Turkey's growing regional role is causing unease in Israel.

Nevertheless, the discrepancy between Ankara's rhetoric towards Israel and its actual policies, as well as its dependence on the US, persists. Although the risk of open conflict has increased, the parties appear to be seeking to avoid it. At the same time, the contradictions between them have deepened to such an extent that they are unlikely to be easily managed through the mechanisms the US is attempting to establish.

Erdoğan's expected visit to Syria

Turkey's foreign policy has been heavily characterised by a drive to increase its regional

influence, centred on Syria, and to adapt to new balances of power, while also aligning itself with the shared interests of the US, Israel and the UK. While Ankara is rapidly formalising its relations with the HTS-controlled government in Damascus, Erdoğan is expected to visit Syria by the end of the year, with the aim of deepening cooperation in the military, security, health and education sectors.

The visit of Turkish warships to the Port of Latakia and announcements regarding the provision of training, equipment and logistical support to the Syrian army demonstrate Turkey's intention to consolidate its influence in Syria.

However, Damascus' continued direct contact with the US, as well as its military cooperation with Russia, indicate an effort to balance Turkey's influence through relations with multiple actors. In Iraq, economic objectives and geopolitical competition are intertwined through the Development Road Project. Iran's opposition to the project represents a significant response to Turkey's efforts to increase its influence over regional trade routes. On the issues of Gaza, Jerusalem and Lebanon, meanwhile, Turkey is seeking to strengthen its role as a regional actor and mediator by continuing its diplomatic initiatives.

Fidan's tour of North Africa

In August, Turkey's policy towards Libya once again came to the fore through a flurry of diplomatic and security-related contacts. Ahead of Hakan Fidan's visit to Libya on 11–12 August, contacts were held with Tripoli's defence and security officials, underlining Ankara's close involvement in Libya's political and military balances.

While in Tripoli, Fidan met Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibeh and Presidential Council Chairman Mohammed Menfi, as well as holding separate meetings with senior figures from the defence, interior, general staff and military intelligence structures. Presented as part of efforts to overcome Libya's east-west divide and unify its military institutions, these contacts also reflected Turkey's determination to preserve and deepen its influence over the Tripoli-based administration.

Fidan's subsequent visit to Benghazi and his meetings with key figures from Khalifa Haftar's camp showed, however, that Ankara no longer intends to confine itself to its traditional allies in western Libya. By establishing direct relations with power centres in the east as well, AKP is seeking to position itself on both sides of Libya's

divided political landscape. What is described as “multifaceted diplomacy” thus also amounts to an attempt to secure Turkey’s room for manoeuvre and protect its interests regardless of how the balance of power inside Libya evolves.

The emphasis placed, during contacts with Egypt, on acting in unison over Libya’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity similarly points to Ankara’s attempt to reconcile its own interventionist role in Libya with a discourse of regional stability and diplomatic coordination. The rapprochement with Cairo therefore does not signal a retreat from competition over Libya, but rather an effort to manage that competition within a changing regional balance.

Ammunition for Ukraine; talks with Russia.

While Turkey presents itself as a diplomatic mediator and seeks to pursue a balancing policy in the Black Sea during the Russia–Ukraine war, it has also continued to supply weapons and ammunition to Ukraine.

According to US Congressional records, Turkey has agreed to sell Ukraine a significant quantity of US-made defence equipment, including 70 M39 ATACMS missiles. As the equipment had originally been sold by the US to Turkey, its resale to Ukraine required US approval under the rules governing third-party transfers. The transfer



has since cleared the US congressional review process, although there has been no public confirmation that the weapons have yet been delivered to Ukraine.

In response to the planned resale of US-made weapons to Ukraine by Turkey, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova argued that this could seriously damage relations with Washington and Ankara. During the same period, the targeting of Turkish-operated vessels, the 'Lider Bordo Mavi' and the 'Lider Kocatepe', in the Black Sea by Ukrainian drones created a new source of tension in Ankara–Kyiv relations. Turkey responded by summoning Ukraine's ambassador to Ankara to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

At their meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek on 1 September, Erdoğan and Putin held talks for nearly an hour and a half. Although the public

statements surrounding the meeting largely emphasised trade, economic cooperation and joint projects, Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov subsequently stated that, as far as he knew, the situation in the Black Sea had been the main topic of the talks. The possibility of renewed Russia–Ukraine negotiations in Turkey was also discussed. Against this background, Ankara’s continued diplomatic engagement with Moscow increasingly contrasts with its deepening involvement in the Western and NATO policies directed against Russia, including its expanding defence cooperation with Ukraine. Rather than reflecting a balance between the two sides, the continued dialogue with Moscow appears increasingly geared towards preserving bilateral ties and the appearance of cooperation as Turkey’s strategic orientation moves further towards the Western camp.



TKP delegation participated in 24th IMCWP and Fidel Colloquium in Cuba



TKP delegation was in Havana for the 24th IMCWP and First International Colloquium "Fidel: Legacy and Future".

The International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties was held in Havana, hosted by the Communist Party of Cuba. In the lead-up to the 100th anniversary of Fidel Castro's birth, this year's meeting was held under the theme: "Defending and honouring the legacy of the Cuban Revolution on the centenary of Fidel's birth; deepening solidarity with socialist Cuba; strengthening our joint actions; and uniting our forces for peace and against imperialist aggression." The Communist Party of Turkey participated in the meeting with a delegation lead by the General Secretary Kemal Okuyan, who took his place on the presidium alongside the leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba in recognition of TKP's contribution to the preparations for the meeting. TKP



General Secretary also delivered the [opening speech](#) at the meeting. Okuyan highlighted the threats and the crisis of the capitalist system and pointed out that communists are the only force within their countries, who defend a real independence, who defend non-interference to countries' internal affairs.

Fidel's 100th birthday was commemorated with the First International Colloquium "Fidel: Legacy and Future", held in Havana on 10–13 August 2026. In his [speech](#), Okuyan emphasized the values that Fidel held, describing communism as a system of values.

"And because of these values: We should strengthen the solidarity work for Cuba. We should find ways to send materials that the Cuban people need urgently. We should spread accurate information about Cuba. We should struggle against the lies. And above all we should fight in a more decisive way against capitalism and imperialism."

During their visit in Havana, TKP General Secretary Kemal Okuyan and the accompanying party delegation was received by Miguel Díaz-Canel, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and President of the Republic of Cuba.

TKP's visit to Cuba in the Turkish media

Following his return to Turkey, TKP General Secretary Kemal Okuyan spoke to Cumhuriyet and Odatv about his impressions of Cuba and the international meeting held in Havana.

Okuyan said that despite deep differences within the international communist movement on some issues, solidarity with Cuba and opposition to the US blockade remain a common ground for communist and workers' parties. He emphasized that the meeting was marked by strong support for Cuba, the historical legacy of Fidel Castro, and firm opposition against imperialist pressure on the island.

TKP commemorated Fidel on the centenary of his birth



TKP organized a series of events in together with the Jose Martí Cuba-(Turkey) Solidarity Association to mark the centenary of Fidel Castro. Friends of TKP and friends of Cuba gathered in İzmir, with the participation of TKP General Secretary Kemal Okuyan and in Ankara, with the participation of TKP Central Committee

member Ali Ufuk Arikan to commemorate Fidel and show their solidarity with Cuba against the blockade.

In both events, Alejandro Francisco Díaz Palacios, Ambassador of the Republic of Cuba to Turkey, addressed the crowd, he emphasized Fidel's historical importance as a revolutionary leader, pointing to his role at decisive moments of the Cuban Revolution, from the attack on the Moncada Barracks to the guerrilla struggle in the Sierra Maestra and the defence of the Bay of Pigs. He underlined that Fidel was always at the forefront of the struggle, marching alongside his people, and said this legacy must be remembered while commemorating the centenary of his birth.

TKP on the workers' agenda



The Communist Party of Turkey joined the miners' ongoing protest in Ankara, standing alongside them in their struggle.

The miners from Yıldızlar SSS Holding Co., had previously received a commitment in April that their wages would be paid, but returned to Ankara in early August after the full payments were not made to all

workers. TKP visited the workers protesting in front of the Ministry of Energy and expressed support for their struggle.

TKP's statement on Mecca Joint Defense Agreement: military alliances bring war, not security

A [statement](#) was issued by the TKP Central Committee following the AKP government's signing of an agreement with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia under the name of the "Mecca Joint Defense Agreement", drawing attention to the risks the agreement, which aligns with US and NATO plans for the region, poses to Turkey.

TKP on the World Peace Day: For a genuine peace, his system must be overthrown

On the occasion of 1 September, [World Peace Day](#), TKP warned that escalating wars and imperialist rivalries are bringing the world closer to a broader conflict. The Party also drew attention to Turkey's growing involvement in these confrontations through NATO and the AKP government's regional policies.

Stressing that lasting peace cannot be achieved without confronting the system that generates war, the TKP called for Turkey's withdrawal from NATO and for strengthening the struggle against imperialism and exploitation.