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Turkey-NATO: Once Again!



Kemal Okuyan - TKP General Secretary

When the AKP came to power at the end of 2002, it had rallied behind it a diverse coalition of forces: 1. Turkey's traditional big capital represented by TÜSİAD (the Turkish Industry and Business Association), 2. Islamist capital seeking a larger share of the economic pie, 3. U.S. imperialism, 4. European imperialist actors, 5. religious sects within Turkey and across the region, and 6. reactionary networks spreading throughout the Arab world, led by the Muslim Brotherhood.

One might ask—what was left out? Indeed, looking at the range of forces that openly supported the AKP, it becomes clear what



kind of trap was being prepared for our people. Of course, each of these actors pursued its own agenda and interests. Yet a very clear common denominator emerged: all saw in the AKP vast opportunities for profit.

Even if that support was not enough; soon, “optimistic” assessments about the AKP began to emerge from the “left” as well. Many began to claim that the AKP would democratize the country and resolve the Kurdish issue. From abroad, too, some progressive parties, believing that the AKP would end “authoritarianism” in Turkey or help address regional issues, gravitated toward supporting Erdoğan. The Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), which argued that the AKP was a counterrevolutionary party driven by a historical mission, found itself almost alone in trying to stand against the tide.

At that time, the AKP’s foreign relations were remarkably clear. Turkey’s relations with three key capitals were warm, and affairs along the Ankara–Washington–London–Berlin axis were running smoothly. By hosting the NATO summit in 2004, Turkey reaffirmed its role as one of the alliance’s most militant and enthusiastic members. Moreover, during those years, the U.S.-led

alliance was invading countries under the pretext of fighting “Islamic terror,” while treating some of the groups the AKP saw as allies as “terrorist” organizations. In fact, one of the AKP’s key foreign policy goals was to serve as a bridge between the Muslim Brotherhood and the United States—a goal it partially achieved over time.

However, with the onset of the Arab Spring, tensions began to grow between the AKP and the Western imperialist countries. Over time, this tension ushered in a “relatively autonomous” phase in Turkey’s foreign policy, during which China—and particularly Russia—became increasingly prominent. There were several reasons behind this tension: 1. The AKP realized that U.S. hegemony was weakening and that a foreign policy entirely dependent on NATO could no longer serve the needs of Turkish capitalism. 2. Both the U.S. and the EU had adopted a crude, dismissive approach that failed to account for the level reached by Turkish capitalism. 3. The AKP was a neo-Ottomanist party seeking to revive the imperial legacy, which required taking greater initiative. 4. Western countries, uneasy with Erdoğan’s unrivaled dominance, began taking steps to create a realistic

alternative to him. 5. The AKP was provoking growing resentment across wide sections of society, worrying both Western actors and domestic capital circles, who concerned that Erdoğan's lack of alternatives posed a systemic threat.

During this period of tension, Turkey engaged in open polemics with the U.S., the European Union, and Israel—going beyond mere rhetoric. While developing economic ties with China, Turkey took steps no NATO member would easily take, such as purchasing the S-400 missile system and building a nuclear power plant with Russia. Things reached a point where intellectuals and politicians began to appear on the international stage portraying Erdoğan as a representative of oppressed nations and the AKP as an anti-imperialist party.

Undoubtedly, this peculiarity stemmed from understanding imperialism merely as a foreign policy practice and reducing it to the actions of the United States alone. Things went so far that some began to speculate that “Turkey would exit NATO.” TKP consistently warned against such illusions, grounding its analyses of AKP's

foreign policy in class realities:

Turkey was never destined to be a passive actor that blindly followed every directive from the United States or the Germany-United Kingdom duo. However, there were clear limits to how far Turkey could stray from NATO. The AKP's steps in the opposite direction were primarily aimed at strengthening its bargaining position. Ultimately, Turkey could not distance itself from the Western alliance economically, politically, or militarily. At the same time, the Western imperialist actors also had a vested interest in maintaining their relationship with the AKP.

Since 2023, Erdoğan has, on one hand, dealt harsh blows to the Western-backed social democratic opposition, while on the other, he has moved to restore ties with the leading imperialist actors. While pro-UK politicians were being placed in all key positions, the situation in Gaza complicated matters for the AKP.

Had the Al-Aqsa Flood not occurred, Erdoğan and Netanyahu were set to meet in Turkey in November 2023. Throughout the resistance and massacres in Gaza, the

AKP maintained a dual policy: adopting a pro-Palestinian stance on the surface while refusing to fully cut political and economic ties with Israel, and even helping neutralize more radical elements within Hamas. Turkey remained silent in the face of Israel's attacks on Lebanon and Iran, and by participating in U.S.-Israel-U.K. operations in Syria, it dealt a severe setback to the Palestinian resistance.

During his "my friend Putin" era, Erdoğan sent the message to the U.S. and other NATO countries: "I have other options." But not only his Western counterparts—Russia too knew that Turkey would never exit NATO. In fact, the Russian administration's goal was a Turkey that caused problems within NATO and did not obey every order. No one actually expected Turkey to form an alliance with Russia and China.

Everyone with a clear head knew that Erdoğan's rapprochement with Russia was a bargaining tactic. And indeed, that closeness repeatedly showed its limits: in Libya, the Caucasus, and Syria, Turkey and Russia came into open conflict. In Ukraine, Turkey initially took a balanced stance, but that has now shifted toward contributing

more to Ukraine's rearmament.

Meanwhile, the U.S., by arming neighboring NATO member Greece and expanding its bases there, signaled that Turkey was not indispensable. Yet NATO still needed Turkey, and Turkish capitalism still needed Western economic backing.

Eventually, the cards were laid on the table—and a rapid thaw followed.

Turkey did not block Finland and Sweden's NATO membership; on the contrary, it ratified them faster than expected. A \$23 billion deal was signed with the U.S. for the sale and modernization of F-16s. The Turkish military began participating more heavily in NATO exercises. Additional Turkish troops were sent to Kosovo as part of NATO forces. Stronger cooperation with Romania and Bulgaria in the Black Sea under NATO's umbrella was initiated. Investments for arms production in Ukraine accelerated. At the Vilnius Summit, Turkey joined the new NATO war concept, achieving a new level of integration with the alliance's eastern flank. Most recently, a \$7 billion deal was signed to purchase 20 Eurofighter Typhoon jets from the United Kingdom. And in 2026, NATO's

next summit will be hosted in Ankara. Strategic mechanisms with the U.S. were reactivated. New steps were taken in cooperation with the U.K. and other European countries on the issue of migrants. Turkey began complying with part of the sanctions imposed on Russia. Decisions were made to reduce energy imports from Russia and increase cooperation with the U.S. A deal was signed to purchase 225 Boeing aircraft from the U.S.

In short, the “anti-imperialist Erdoğan” rapidly transformed back into the “strategic partner of the U.S.” None of this surprised us. The U.S. and EU need Turkey—its regional role and its army. And Turkey needs economic ties with the West and their support for its regional ambitions. There will surely be ups and downs, but it’s clear that Turkish foreign policy is returning to its familiar course.

As always, we will continue our struggle—at home and abroad—against imperialism, multinational monopolies, and exploitation. Without being deceived or deceiving others!



Why Has TKP Become the “Object of Hatred” of the Turkish Left?

Cansu Oba,

Member of TKP Central Committee

For readers who are not deeply familiar with the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) or Turkish politics, the title may sound exaggerated. Yet, within a realistic framework, it accurately reflects the dynamics we aim to explore here. Around the world, traditional communist parties have often faced political and ideological hostility from within the left itself. Understanding how this phenomenon has unfolded in Turkey requires looking closely at the origins and historical assertion of TKP. TKP is a party with a 105-year history marked by interruptions. The causes and nature of many of these interruptions are discussed

in another article in this issue. Although the current organization officially adopted the TKP name in 2001, it traces its roots back to the founding of the first TKP on September 10, 1920, and embraces the entire legacy of Turkey's revolutionary socialist and communist tradition.

The unquestioned legitimacy of today's TKP in carrying the party's name begins with its role in restoring that name to political life and to the Turkish working class. To understand this claim, however, one must look briefly at a key historical turning point.

In the 1970s, Turkey found itself in an objectively revolutionary situation, as the system underwent a deep and structural crisis. This process was violently interrupted by the fascist military coup of September 12, 1980, which dealt a crushing blow to the left and to the working class movement as a whole. The defeat was enforced not only through repression, bans, and martial law, but also through executions and torture. The use of national symbols like the flag and national anthem during these brutal tortures was carefully designed to make the Turkish left

hate its own country—to sever its emotional and political connection with it.

Tragically, this counterrevolutionary strategy worked. The Turkish left, in nearly all its components, lost hope in the country—some even turned against it.

It is a painful story.

The fascist junta's methods were extraordinarily harsh and inhumane, and the human and organizational toll they exacted must be understood.

Yet, the TKP's rejection of the post-coup landscape was primarily a response to the ideological and political climate that took hold within the left itself.

In 1986, while political bans were still in effect, the *Gelenek (Tradition) movement* had been built around the theoretical socialist periodical *Gelenek*. Formed by the cadres who would later establish today's TKP, this movement was a defiant challenge to the rising counterrevolutionary tide both in Turkey and in the world. It was also a direct confrontation with the revisionist tendencies gaining ground

in Marxist-Leninist theory and practice. This challenge deeply unsettled sections of the left that had abandoned revolutionary struggle, renounced the very idea of a socialist revolution, and subordinated their political identity to the increasingly dominant Kurdish nationalist movement, choosing to operate under its shadow.

Their discomfort stemmed from the sense that the TKP was “spoiling the game.” Just as the left was preparing to align itself conveniently with bourgeois political actors, the TKP insisted on a politics outside the system—exposing these alignments as pseudo-leftist. While the left had begun to center its politics on “peace,” “democracy,” and “justice”—themes that, though important, cannot replace the struggle against exploitation—the TKP argued that without a class basis, such struggles inevitably remain within the confines of bourgeois politics.

Thus, TKP’s emergence as a source of irritation—and ultimately, as an “object of hatred”—within the left began with its insistence on class struggle.

Staying the course

The **Socialist Turkey Party**, founded by the Gelenek movement in 1992, was banned in the following year. It was immediately reconstituted as the **Socialist Power Party (SİP)**, which in 2001 adopted the historic name Communist Party of Turkey (TKP). At the time, it was still technically illegal to form a party under the “communist” title. Exploiting gaps in bourgeois law, the TKP defied this ban and brought the communist name back to Turkish politics.

Soon after TKP’s reestablishment, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in November 2002. The AKP’s rise was shaped by U.S. imperialism, Islamist sects, and big monopolies; it represented a coalition of business interests and religious orders. Its mission was to complete the counterrevolutionary process begun in 1980 by dismantling what remained of the republican, statist, and secular foundations established in 1923.

The ideological “vaccine” injected into the left by the 1980 coup—its anti-republican

sentiment—resonated with the values the AKP promoted: reducing the state’s role, ending “top-down republicanism,” and expanding democracy and religious freedom. In reality, these meant deepening exploitation, eroding workers’ gains, empowering Sunni Islamism throughout state and society, and destroying the secular social fabric.

From the beginning, TKP recognized the AKP’s class nature and its role as a special mission party for capitalist restoration and imperialist integration. While TKP consistently and accurately opposed the AKP, much of the Turkish left—under the illusion that “the tutelary regime is being broken”—either openly or tacitly supported it at first.

Against the tide

During the same years, Turkey’s **European Union accession process** gained momentum. Following the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the idea of “the Europe of Labor” spread within the Turkish left—a fantasy that not only misled but also weakened working-class resistance to both imperialism and the AKP. The TKP stood alone against this pro-EU current, preventing the left from permanently sliding into a pro-European

orientation. Even as other leftists gradually adjusted their rhetoric, resentment among the left toward the TKP deepened.

Later, when the **Syriza** experience in Greece emerged, much of the Turkish left sought to emulate it, while the TKP—together with its fraternal parties in Europe, particularly the Communist Party of Greece (KKE)—warned of the liberal illusions that such movements created at the expense of workers' rights. Soon after taking power, the AKP began its **operation to dismantle the Republic**, targeting the military and civilian bureaucracy through the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials. Hundreds were imprisoned on politically motivated charges. Once again, the AKP sought to win the support of liberals and leftists by appealing to their anti-republican sentiments. And once again, much of the left fell into this trap—some by remaining silent, others by framing the trials as “democratization” or “cleansing the deep state.” Although many of those targeted were not figures the TKP could politically endorse, the party focused on the broader project behind the trials—the AKP's attempt to redesign Turkey—and stood against them. In his 2009 book *The Left Trapped Between Ergenekon and the AKP*, TKP General

Secretary **Kemal Okuyan** explained why supporting these trials in the name of the left was a scandal. Years later, when the left was forced to acknowledge that the TKP had been right, it did not abandon its hostility anyway. TKP never dismissed the popular uprisings as mere conspiracies—recognizing that these movements initially emerged as reactions against poverty and corruption—but it also warned that imperialism was exploiting these movements to reshape the region in line with its own interests. The rise of jihadist militias, mass killings, and U.S. imperialism’s renewed foothold in the region revealed that what had begun as uprisings was quickly turned into an imperialist restructuring project. While much of the left hailed these events as “revolutions,” the TKP defended the integrity of the very concept of revolution and refused to let it be degraded.

A profound clash of perspectives

The recurring tension between TKP and the rest of the Turkish left reflects, at its core, a fundamental difference in their perspectives. Over time, much of the left abandoned the idea of the **actuality of a socialist revolution**. During the AKP’s “liberal phase” in the first

years of its government, class analysis was replaced by a focus on the “state versus society” contradiction. Later, as the AKP became more authoritarian, the left justified its abandonment of revolutionary politics under the banner of “united struggle against the palace regime.”

This tendency has persisted: much of the left now defines its politics in relation to the **CHP** (the social-democratic main opposition) or the **DEM Party** (the political party of Kurdish nationalism). During elections, this alignment becomes explicit—some leftist parties even field candidates on their lists and campaign for them—while in ordinary times it prevents the development of an independent socialist line. The TKP’s efforts to build such an independent path through social alliances have again made it a source of irritation, accused of “arrogance” and “sectarianism.”

During the “**peace process**”, this divide deepened further. While most of the left limited its criticism to whether the AKP would keep its promises, the TKP—while welcoming disarmament—warned that the process must be judged by its direction. The Party highlighted this process’ connection to

U.S. imperialism's plan to redesign the Middle East, its harmony with Turkish capital's Neo-Ottomanist expansionism, and its Sunni-Islamist ideological foundation. TKP insisted that neither Turkish nor Kurdish workers had any interest in such a "capitalist peace." Once again, the left chose to attack the TKP rather than engage with the content of its critique.

Breaking away, growing stronger

TKP long ago broke its ties with such a left that has distanced itself from revolution, avoided real struggle, and chosen the comfort of bourgeois political alliances. Yet as hostility toward the TKP within the left has grown, public interest in the party has increased. This rising attention in the political sphere confirms the accuracy of the TKP's decision at its 14th Congress in 2024—its decision to make a clean break from the rest of the left that lacks any will and action for organizing a genuine revolutionary struggle.





Are Femicides in Turkey Independent of Classes?

Senem Doruk,

Member of TKP Central Committee

Violence against women in Turkey continues to escalate. We are not just talking about a quantitative increase; the nature, diversity, prevalence, and frequency of violence are also escalating day by day.

Although the first form of violence that comes to mind is often physical, women encounter various forms of violence across many areas of their lives.

The most severe form of violence against

women—the deprivation of a woman’s right to life—has become a social issue that needs to be specifically addressed in Turkey today.

Today in Turkey, more than one woman is killed every day. It is not possible to access sufficient data and analysis on femicides in Turkey from official state sources. Although reports on femicides have been published by state institutions or certain non-governmental organisations functioning under the guidance of the government, the fundamental problem lies not in the collection and dissemination of data, but in the absence of a formal classification of “femicide” by the state and the lack of an official acknowledgment of the issue, effectively rendering it invisible.¹

According to data published by We Will Stop Femicide Platform, 136 women were killed in Turkey in the first six months of 2025. Notably, this figure does not include suspicious deaths, workplace accidents, or fatalities resulting from occupational diseases. While these figures reveal the grim reality of a deeply troubling problem, they also provide clear evidence that femicides are neither “accidental,” “isolated,” nor “marginal” incidents. Femicides constitute a complex social issue that requires a multidimensional and comprehensive approach.

So where do the roots and sources of this social problem lie?

Although it has increased significantly in recent times, violence against women and femicide is not a recent phenomenon. Inequality between the genders and violence against women correspond historically to the existence of class-based societies. In class-based societies where the domination of one class over another is considered legitimate, the subjugation of one individual over another is similarly regarded “natural” and accepted. For this reason, we can trace the roots of oppression against women to the history of class-based societies that push women into a secondary position in society. An exploitative social system produces inequality, oppression, and violence. A system that legitimizes exploitation and views it as immutable will inevitably legitimize violence as well. Thus, the origin of gender inequality— and the violence that arises from it— lies precisely in the exploitative social system itself. It is no coincidence that femicides increase in societies where exploitation is deeply entrenched and inequalities are most sharply felt. One of the clearest illustrations of the class-based nature of this problem is the rise in femicides alongside increasing poverty and financial hardship during

periods of economic crisis.

Today, capitalism attempts to conceal the fact that class-based societies and mechanisms of exploitation lie at the root of gender inequality. Liberal ideology predominantly asserts that the perpetrator of violence is the man, and that this stems from the nature of male biology; it thus seeks the solution in the “taming” of violent men. Yes, it is indeed a reality that violence is predominantly perpetrated by men today. However, attributing the source of violence against women solely to the male biological characteristics and male dominance obscures the class dynamics, exploitation mechanisms, and capitalist domination that constitute the source of violence, leading to a misguided understanding. In capitalism, reducing the source of inequality between women and men to biological roots is one of the fundamental obstacles to women’s emancipation. As long as women’s struggle for equality is reduced to being “equal to men,” it obscures the truth that women’s emancipation can only be achieved in a classless and exploitation-free society. This is one of the most damaging impacts on the women’s struggle.

So, until the goal of a classless and exploitation-free society is achieved, are we to remain

mere spectators to the killing of women? Is it impossible or unrealistic to fight against the violence and murders that women are most brutally subjected to within this very system? Of course not. The struggle we wage is entirely actual. Today, for women to live in a country where they are not subjected to violence or killed, this system must change. We know that there is no such thing as a “better” capitalism. That is why, as we strive with all our strength to change this system, we see every struggle against the oppression, brutality, and inequality experienced by women as inseparable from the demand for systemic change. We assert that women’s struggle for existence and equality cannot be separated from the struggle against capitalism.

The struggle against the dominance of holdings and the plundering of our country’s resources by a handful of capitalists cannot be separated from women’s struggle for equality. These two struggles strengthen and empower each other. As women raise their voices against this ferocious system of exploitation that severs them from life, as they organize and intensify the struggle against bourgeois who see women as a source of cheap labor, fire them at the first opportunity, and employ them without insurance

or security, they will weaken this system.

We will grow stronger as we build an unhesitating line of resistance against religious reactionism that imprisons women, confines them to the home, and excludes them from social life. By defending the values of the Republic — which is under fierce attack — and by setting the goal of establishing a new Republic before us, we will shape our current line of struggle. In the fight against femicides, we will confront the power of capital's dominance. Our immediate demands will be to prevent individual armament, ensure that violence against women is punished with the harshest legal sanctions, guarantee the effective implementation of laws protecting women, and prosecute the public institutions, agencies, and officials responsible for failing to protect women. We will never stop emphasizing that it is this system that causes women to be torn from life and brutally murdered, while also expanding our struggle to ensure that the state fulfills its duty to protect its citizens.

If this system creates inequality, imposes it, perpetuates it, and allows it to become increasingly brutal, and if this is the choice and desire of the ruling class that maintains this system, then it is our duty to destroy it. For this

reason, femicides are far from being independent of class issue.

Let us remember that throughout history, as the working class struggle has grown stronger, women have gained rights, become more powerful in the face of oppression and tyranny, and their gains have expanded. As the working class has retreated from the political stage, the capitalist class has grown more aggressive—a reality that has meant far greater exploitation, violence, oppression, and coercion for women. Just as it does today.

Therefore, defending women's right to life is only possible by expanding the struggle for socialism. So long as our current struggles remain inseparable from the demand for systemic change, they will illuminate our class's path and open space for us to grow our fight—side by side and arm in arm with ever more women.

[1] from ASE Femicides Report.

Founded in 2017, the ASE (Academy of Science and Enlightenment) is a platform that unites scientists and intellectuals committed to advancing science free from the influence of market relations and reactionary ideologies, with a public-orientation. Operating from a perspective of scientific socialism, the ASE has carried out research, published reports, organized symposia and panels, and issued a peer-reviewed quarterly journal titled Matter, Dialectics and Society.



AKP and the Project to Colonize Palestine

Murat Akad,

Member of TKP Party Council

Turkey and many other Islamic countries are among the international partners of the project to make Gaza into a new labor hell spearheaded by the United States. This project has aroused the appetite of Turkey and many other Islamic countries are among the international partners of the project to make Gaza into a new labor hell spearheaded by the United States. This project has aroused the appetite of capitalists in many countries.

Although it does not officially bear such a name, the plan referred to in the imperialist press as Trump's Gaza peace plan - which in fact aims to transform Gaza into a modern colony - has

received international support. The plan first came to attention on the last days of September. On September 23, as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) was meeting, a meeting was held in New York on Trump's initiative, hosted by him and the Emir of Qatar. During the meeting, attended by 8 Islamic countries including Turkey, Trump presented a proposal called "principles for peace." The countries attending the meeting expressed their great satisfaction with the ongoing talks. The President of Turkey, Tayyip Erdoğan expressed similar views.

Later, at the press conference held following an in-person meeting between Trump and Netanyahu on September 29, the plan, which was named the Trump Plan and included certain concrete steps, was announced. What was announced was not a peace plan but a colonization project. The countries which attended the meeting on September 23, despite stating the need for clarifications regarding certain topics such as the timetable for Israeli withdrawal and the neutralization of Hamas, eventually expressed their support for the plan. Turkey also argued that some of the articles were against Hamas and Gaza.

However, those who had objected quickly fell silent, and all countries which participated in the

process began doing everything in their power to ensure the implementation of the plan. It is clear that the meeting in New York, rather than discussing the contents of the plan, instead focused on what those countries could do to implement the plan.

The Role of the AKP Government

Erdoğan had an additional meeting with Trump in Washington DC, which he travelled to after the UNGA. The discussion covered various topics, but it was not fully revealed how the Gaza issue was addressed. Erdoğan stated that the meeting was successful in this respect, as it was with other topics.

Trump's remarks and the subsequent steps taken by the AKP government revealed Turkey's role in the plan. Trump said that alongside Egypt and Qatar, Turkey also had to convince Hamas regarding the plan. Erdoğan later confirmed this. The AKP government was, in effect, assigned this task. One of the journalists closest to the government reported that following news suggesting Hamas would reject the plan, Trump called Erdoğan and urged him to focus on the issue, saying, "I've done a lot for you. Now I need you to do this."

It remains unclear what exactly Trump “did” for Erdoğan. Tom Barrack - a businessman who is the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Special Representative for Syria - gave an important hint on this matter before the Trump-Erdoğan meeting, and stated that the U.S. had provided Erdoğan with “legitimacy.” This means that the U.S. administration is giving the AKP, whose support in the country is steadily declining, a kind of “lifeline” and signaling its preference for the continuation of this rule. One of the returns expected for this support appeared to be persuading Hamas to accept the plan.

In the days following Hamas’s decision to agree to negotiations over the plan, The Wall Street Journal published an article claiming that Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt had pressured Hamas by warning that, should it reject the plan, they would withdraw all support. Hamas’s subsequent announcement that it would accept the plan on the condition that certain points be negotiated, and its decision to remain at the table, indicated that Hamas had indeed been “convinced.”

Investments to “New Gaza”

The future envisioned by the U.S. for both Gaza and the West Bank is definitely not the establishment of an independent and sovereign

Palestinian state. According to current projections, Gaza will be rebuilt and transformed into a tourism hub - a kind of "free zone." An international body will be established to manage this process, and Trump at its head. His deputy will be the "Bush's poodle" Tony Blair, one of the old guards of imperialism.

The implementation of this plan is stirring the appetite of imperialist circles. One of the goals of imperialism's interventions in the Middle East is to turn the region into a cheap labor paradise where borders are blurred, nation states are dissolved, and resistance is broken. Such a goal naturally excites capitalists in the region. Gaza will be the first example of this.

Turkish capital also calculates that it'll play a role in the restructuring of Gaza. From this perspective, the government's desire to see the war end and a new phase open in line with the plan is entirely understandable. Numerous examples from the past had already demonstrated that the AKP prioritized the brotherhood of capital over the brotherhood of religion.

The AKP government had to tolerate certain tensions with Israel while opening up such an arena for the Turkish capital. These tensions

have been evident for a long time. On the other hand, for a more profitable future for capital, the two countries need to achieve a kind of “peace.” Turkish capital has been pursuing this for a long time. As may be recalled, relations were rapidly normalizing before the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation which began on October 7, 2023, and an Erdoğan-Netanyahu meeting was imminent. With Al-Aqsa Flood, these plans were disrupted.

Over the past two years, the AKP government has ostensibly defended Palestine against Israel. However, it has consistently avoided taking the necessary steps to fully follow through on this stance. For example, not halting trade with Israel undermines symbolic gestures such as demanding FIFA ban Israel from international football tournaments. Although the government has claimed for over a year that trade between Turkey and Israel has stopped, it is known that this does not reflect reality, as trade continues through indirect channels, and ship traffic from Turkish ports to Israeli ports is ongoing. Israel also continues to receive a significant portion of its oil from Azerbaijan, through a pipeline that passes through Turkey. The AKP government has done nothing to shut off this pipeline to date.

Now there is a desire for relations to normalize again. Even though it is not yet clear how the plan

will be implemented, discussions are already underway about resuming Turkish Airlines flights to Tel Aviv, which had been suspended after October 7. Before October 7, Turkish Airlines and other Turkish airline companies operated more than 10 flights a day between Istanbul and Tel Aviv. Istanbul was Israel's gateway to the outside world.

Trump Missed the Award but Won

Now, as Palestine is attempted to be turned into a new colony, we find ourselves at a point where capitalists are engaging in plunder, and establishment politicians are striving to gain prestige in the new period. Trump repeatedly asserts that he has ended numerous wars, and made no secret of his expectation to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. This prize has become so meaningless over the decades that if Trump were to actually receive it, no one would have been surprised. But another person, who is a complete tool of imperialism was awarded.

All these attempts are aimed at defeating the Palestinian resistance. However, we have seen for decades that resistance is part of the Palestinian spirit. Even if it sometimes suffers setbacks, it cannot be broken. The struggle will continue until Palestine is free.



The Liquidation of the Communist Party in Turkey:

An Example of Self-Liquidation Wave During the Gorbachev Era

Aydemir Güler,

Member of TKP Party Council

The Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) was founded in 1920 on a premise that differed from the Western model. The industrial revolution had only partially and unevenly affected certain very limited regions of the Ottoman Empire, which made the emergence of a strong social-democratic movement impossible. Moreover, the regions and communities where the workers' movement had been strongest were largely separated from the newly emerging Turkish state. The Macedonia region would

gradually become part of Greece, the socialist current rooted in Armenian intellectual circles was wiped out beginning in 1915, the capital İstanbul would be occupied at the end of the World War I, and İzmir, the critical port city for Mediterranean trade, would later share the same fate. Turkey was locked onto the agenda of an anti-imperialist national liberation struggle. The communist movement, unlike its Western counterparts that had emerged from within social democracy, was born in opposition to occupation, arising directly from the struggle for national liberation.¹

History of Liquidations

When the Kemalist leadership achieved military victory in 1922 and established the Republic in 1923, the country, having been at war continuously since 1912, was economically devastated, and the already fragile working class had further diminished in size and strength. The bourgeois Kemalist regime's propensity for preventing any political dynamism on its left exacerbated the communist movement's disadvantages. Although the regime carried a revolutionary character in the sense of establishing a democratic republic, the class composition upon which it rested—property-owning strata—closed the door to the

organization of the working class and the toiling people. Under these conditions, the TKP was subjected to a heavy crackdown in 1927, part of its leadership was forced into exile, the Party organization was largely dissolved, the central committee was unable to issue publications, and the very existence of the Party became a matter of debate. This process can be regarded as the first liquidation of the TKP.²

During this first liquidation a group³ emerged within the Party that argued for abandoning organizational work altogether. Yet the Party did not surrender to this thesis. The primary liquidator was the State itself.

After a period of recovery, during which the Party experimented with various initiatives under conditions of illegality, the Party suffered another devastating blow by the Ankara government, which rapidly turned toward integration with the Western bloc after World War II. After the imprisonment of many cadres in 1951, the TKP suspended its activities within the country. In the 1960s, the Party limited itself to supporting the Workers' Party of Turkey (TİP), a legal socialist party led by Marxist intellectuals who had been trained within the TKP tradition.

Throughout the 1950s, the Party experienced

certain internal divisions. However, though the sides accused each other of deviations from communism, none of the factions questioned the existence of the communist party itself. Once again, the liquidationist attack had come from the State.

The Third Wave and Reorganization

After the 1971 military memorandum closed down the TIP, the TKP returned to active struggle in 1973–1974. Although a legal organization was prohibited, the Party quickly became a force in the workers' movement and gained influence in the leadership of the the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK), which encompassed left-wing unions. Meanwhile, the TIP was reestablished as a legal party with a Marxist-Leninist character. Like the TKP, the TIP was loyal to the Comintern and Soviet tradition. While the TIP program⁴ called for a socialist revolution, the TKP advocated a transition to advanced democracy and envisioned an alliance with social democrats and/or the national bourgeoisie. There were two communist parties: the legal TIP, which had a more radical program but was less influential, and the illegal TKP, which had not such an advanced programme when compared to

TİP but was highly influential among masses. Another advantage of the TKP was its close relationship with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its acceptance and prestige as a member of the family of world communist parties. Indeed, the Party's position—advocating not an immediate revolutionary rupture with capitalism but rather a democratic transformation and distancing from NATO—bore the unmistakable imprint of Soviet influence.

In terms of cadre composition, both parties (along with a third Soviet-style party, the Socialist Workers' Party of Turkey-TSİP) came from the TKP tradition. Despite their programmatic differences, a unification agenda began to emerge in the late 1970s, with the TKP expected to serve as the dominant force in any merger. After the fascist military coup of 1980, the entire left went underground, and unification became inevitable. In 1985, just as a new page was turned in the Soviet Union, the founding of the United Communist Party of Turkey (TBKP) was also announced.

However, on the slippery slope leading up to the 1980 coup, the entire left had failed the test. Turkish capitalism had plunged into a severe crisis, fascist attacks and mass killings

targeting the left and the working class had intensified, and the footsteps of a revolutionary situation could be heard. Numerous parties and organizations scattered across the Soviet, Maoist, and centrist/revolutionary democratic factions of the left were confronted with the question of how to respond strategically to these conditions. Between 1977 and 1979, the left wings of virtually all organizations were purged, without exception. The Turkish left was unable to position itself as an alternative to the power and retreated to defensive positions of democracy and anti-fascism. On the opposing side, all segments of the bourgeoisie and their political representatives united in one common front: to stop the rise of the left and the working class at any cost. The fascist military coup of 1980 was thus grounded in a broad consensus of the ruling classes. The left waited in vain for this front to fracture and for democratic allies to emerge from within it. The 1980 coup dealt a heavy blow to the politically unprepared left and the working class.

In 1985, the newly united Party was defeated and exhausted internally. Externally, the Soviet Union was gradually approaching a crisis, the new leadership was preparing to apologize (!) for the socialist experience, and signs of

reconciliation with imperialism were already visible. Within a few years, it became clear that glasnost and perestroika were code names for self-liquidation. In fact, in the 1980s, neoliberalism had launched an offensive on all fronts. Whether it was the changes in the Soviet Union, the coup in Turkey, or the establishment of new governments in most imperialist countries determined to remove public barriers to marketization, everything was part of the same totality.

TBKP was formed a few years ago through the merger of two parties that had shed tendencies representing revolutionary approaches to the crisis. Undoubtedly, thousands of communist workers, youth, and intellectuals had taken their places within the movement with revolutionary enthusiasm. However, the TBKP emerged as the most right-wing and exaggerated interpreter of the agenda introduced by the CPSU in the international communist movement. To them, the revolutionary role of the working class was put into question. Capitalism and socialism were said to be converging. Reducing democracy to a matter of class struggle was proclaimed as an archaic approach. Under these conditions, a socialist political revolution was no longer necessary on humanity's path to emancipation.

The Communist Party, under these conditions, should be redesigned not as the vanguard revolutionary party of the working class, but as a social movement paving the way for democratization. This new type of Communist Party was to be free from centralism, the idea of vanguardism, and ideological and programmatic homogeneity. The TBKP concealed its revisionist theses behind exciting slogans of unity, legality, and renewal. The divisions among the left would be ended, it would become a legal party, and everything that had led to past defeats would be transcended to renew the movement.

In the second half of the 1980s, all of this was intensely debated within Marxist-Leninist and pro-Soviet circles. Among a number of revolutionary groups, the one that stood out was the organization around the journal ***Gelenek*** ("Tradition" – still the name of the theoretical periodical of the Communist Party of Turkey), which exposed the new orientation as a turn toward self-liquidation. In later years, ***Gelenek*** would be the current that reorganized the TKP.

During the same period, the workers' movement began to recover from the aftermath of the coup. Between 1987 and 1991, Turkey witnessed

a wave of strikes, while public-sector workers began forming unions, and the university youth also became active again. However, the communist movement lacked the motivation to carry this social movement forward. Revisionist theses were turning the movement inward, distancing from any claim towards society or the masses.

The right-wing liberal government, whose leader had also served in the junta's cabinets, gave a favorable response to the TBKP's desire for legalization – and thus liquidation began under the guise of success and opportunity!

The two leaders of the TBKP, one from the TKP and the other from the TİP tradition, returned to the country in 1987 and were imprisoned. By the time they were released in 1990, the communist party tradition had largely turned into an unorganized public sentiment. Whether Nihat Sargin, from TİP, a respected veteran of the movement, or Nabi Yağcı, from TKP, the younger figure who led the self-liquidation initiative, made little difference at that point. What mattered was the result. The essential outcome was clear: the prevailing view held that the party needed to open itself to non-Marxists and bourgeois democrats.

The goal was no longer a party that would lead a revolution.

The TBKP was legally established in 1990 and was shut down by the Constitutional Court a year later. At that time, the Soviet Union was also dissolving. The process experienced by the Party in Turkey was consistent with that of the CPSU. The Party leadership invited members to join a socialist legal party.

Through subsequent mergers with various leftist groups, this formation evolved within five years into a “radical democratic” platform that explicitly rejected being a class party. Later, this platform too disintegrated through internal splits.

As mentioned above, ***Gelenek*** stood out among the Marxist-Leninist groups that objected to this process. At the height of the liquidation, in 1992, the ***Gelenek*** movement organized a legal party. In 2001, in an atmosphere where reactionary forces had restructured the ruling power in Turkey and the left had become ineffective, the name TKP was adopted by a congress decision.⁵ The third liquidation of the communist movement, which we can roughly date to 1990 after 1927 and 1951, was thus repelled. Many veteran revolutionaries who had come up through the old party joined the ranks

of the current TKP, while its central leadership was drawn from the ***Gelenek movement***.

The Dawn of Liquidation

The events described above resemble the bitter experiences of communist parties in other countries. Indeed, at the historical turning point of the 1990s, communist parties everywhere came under tremendous pressure; splits, name changes, and self-liquidations became commonplace. Yet, this global trend has materialized in a unique context in each country and each party. We must also look at the Turkish experience through an objective lens based on reality.

The TKP ended its period of inactivity within the country with its Atılım (Breakthrough) decision in 1973. The Central Committee's organ began publication in January 1974 with the same name. Prior to this moment, the TKP had continued to exist as a central structure abroad, organizing among Turkish workers in Europe and addressing the country through radio broadcasts. From 1975 onwards, a very valuable chapter began, with the Party organically taking the stage as the vanguard of the working class. The program called for an alliance with the national bourgeoisie

and democratic progress. Although the practical implications of this vision were never announced, it would not be wrong to assume that it referred to the Kemalist-rooted social-democratic party CHP coming to power. Election policies also largely support this interpretation.

From Turkey's perspective, this program and strategy were inappropriate. On the one hand, the Soviet Union viewed Turkey as a border country where "revolutionary risks" should not be taken; on the other hand, the class reality of Turkey offered no basis for an alliance between the working class and any faction of the bourgeoisie. The actuality of the socialist revolution was never accepted by the Comintern-Soviet line. Turkey's revolutionary potential was generally underestimated.

This factor strengthened the position of right-wing elements within the communist movement, pushed the Party's position to the right, and suppressed left-wing commentators. The TKP's great fortune was that a series of its historical leaders possessed the political quality and revolutionary character to insist on the Marxist-Leninist path and to uphold the internationalism embodied in the Soviet tradition. Unfortunately, these

resources had been exhausted by the time the glasnost/perestroika period began.

Certain examples are outright shameful. The reaction given by the Party organization to the fascist military coup of September 12, 1980, was to label the coup as fascist and seek opportunities for resistance. Within a few days, the Party center corrected the character of the coup as a “military overthrow.” This semantic shift, devoid of conceptual meaning, merely reflected an effort to avoid using the word fascist:

“The Party announced to the masses from day one that the attack was directed at the working class and progressive forces. On the other hand, the TKP took into account the junta’s stance toward the fascist MHP, its foreign policy tendencies, the influence of patriotic forces within the army, and the existence of contradictions within the army. It opposed the regime being defined as a fascist dictatorship. The September 12 call emphasized that the junta could not solve any of the critical problems it faced. It called on all national democratic forces to unite and organize themselves in accordance with the new conditions.”⁶

“We believe everyone agrees that the military dictatorship is a reactionary dictatorship. However, to label this regime as fascist would mean ignoring the distinctions within the army between fascist elements, the MHP and its backers, and the political representatives of the monopolies’ reactionary policies.”⁷

The TKP thus failed to grasp that the bourgeoisie, the state apparatus, and bourgeois politics had united in a highly coherent historical program under imperialist direction. Instead, it tried to discover supposed divisions within the order. The following passage epitomizes the Party’s alliance policy, which bore no relation to the country’s actual reality:

“Today, there are circles that support the junta on the one hand, yet adopt a stance in favor of peace on certain material issues on the other. These circles must not forget that they can only achieve their goals by collaborating with the consistent defenders of peace. We extend our hand to everyone, including these circles, who raise their voices for peace, to reduce tension, and to protect our country from being dragged into imperialist folly.”⁸

At that time, the domestic structure of TKP was in organizational disintegration. A campaign of state terror was unleashed against all revolutionary movements. DİSK, in which the TKP played an important role, had been shut down; its unionist and worker leaders, both Party members and sympathizers, were arrested. On October 7, 1980, the death sentence of a member of a revolutionary organization was executed. However, an operation directly targeting the TKP would not take place until the summer 1981.

Among those arrested were members of the Politburo and Central Committee. The Party leadership seized this opportunity to purge left-wing elements. A Politburo member and a Central Committee member who had been under torture were declared agents, while another Politburo member positioned on the left was stripped of active administrative responsibilities.⁹ It was in this process that the question of who would succeed the Party's secretary general, İsmail Bilen (born in 1902) was resolved. Nabi Yağcı (known by his Party name Haydar Kutlu) assumed the practical leadership as "Deputy Secretary General."¹⁰ At this time, the Party's activities within the

country had come to a standstill, and CC member and İstanbul Provincial Secretary Mustafa Hayrullahoğlu was tortured to death in November 1982.

While these events unfolded, the central leadership of the Party was trying to prove that the September 12 coup was not fascist. A brochure was published in 1982, signed by Kerim Seyran, which justified the avoidance of the term fascism through observations in three areas. The first foreign policy:

“In foreign policy (especially up to the winter of 1982), we observe that the junta has not engaged itself with the aggressive line of US imperialism against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, but rather emphasized that it wanted to develop relations them.”¹¹

Second, domestic politics: the focus was on exposing the crimes of the MHP. Afterwards, in economic policy, it was argued that while “the most reactionary circles of monopoly capital” supported Özal¹², another section [of the capital-owners] took a different position, pointing out that Özal was forced to resign in July 1982. Finally, the discussion turned to “the composition of the army.” There were all kinds of views within the army, and everyone

had to take into account “the existence of a significant number of working-class, patriotic officers in the middle and lower ranks of the army.”

In conclusion:

“... The September 12 coup reflects not the dominance of fascist elements, which undoubtedly held an important place within the army, but rather a compromise under the dominance of groups aligned with monopolies and imperialism.”¹³

These theses did not rest on a class analysis. The TKP leadership sought to conceal the overt pro-Americanism of September 12, claimed to distinguish between the most reactionary and less reactionary factions of monopoly capital, and asserted that there were patriots within the Turkish Armed Forces who “had to be considered.”

Kurtuluş (Emancipation), a publication of the Party in West Germany, printed side-by-side photos of Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev and coup leader Kenan Evren in its April 15, 1981 issue (No. 237), using the headline “60 Years of Turkish-Soviet Friendship.”¹⁴

Later, the liquidationist leaders of the Party sought to explain away these tragic mistakes as the result of Soviet influence. By portraying the disintegration of a communist party that they claimed as dependent on the CPSU could be presented not as liquidation but as renewal!

Who Is to Blame?

During the Soviet era, there might have been unhealthy elements in the institutional system that structured relations between the CPSU and its sister parties. Indeed, the fact that Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin played a central role in the CPSU's routine relations with the TKP is itself revealing. Zagladin was a member of the CPSU Central Committee and was responsible for Western European affairs in the International Relations Department. He served as First Deputy Secretary of the Department from 1964 to 1988. In the 1970s and 1980s, he was the CPSU official in charge of relations with the TKP and he rose to prominence alongside Gorbachev. He was one of the architects of the glasnost era. He had personal acquaintances, even friendships, with Western European leaders. In 1988, he joined the counter-revolutionary leadership cadre by becoming one of Gorbachev's advisors.

He served as vice president of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance (AEAC), and organization devoted to fostering relations between Russia and NATO. When he died in 2006, he was on the board of the Gorbachev Foundation. The liquidationist leadership of the TKP was an extension of this school of thought.

However, it is absurd to place the blame for the shameful record exemplified above on the CPSU and to absolve the TKP's liquidationist leadership—or those who did not object to the liquidation—of their responsibility. Responsibility should be sought not in the side that exerted the influence, but in those who submitted. The history of the TKP, in this respect, is full of examples of principled stances and dignified conduct.¹⁵

The self-liquidation movement that gradually disintegrated the Party throughout the 1980s drew its ideological nourishment from glasnost-style liberalism and was led by a cadre inclined toward left liberalism.

[1] At the founding congress of the TKP held in Baku, the capital of Soviet Azerbaijan, on September 10, 1920, Mustafa Suphi was elected as the secretary. Mustafa Suphi was a progressive working class patriot who escaped from prison in the Ottoman Empire and fled to Russia by sea, eventually joining the Bolshevik Party. The party was founded with

the participation of delegates from numerous organizations in Turkey.

[2] The person who led the party for a long time was Şefik Hüsnü, who was also a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

[3] This group included individuals who would publish the ideological political organ of the Kemalist movement in 1932. The journal aimed to shape a statist and populist anti-imperialist line.

[4] Behice Boran, who was the general chairperson in 1970, played a key role in the TİP adopting its socialist revolution program. Boran was a social scientist and academic who joined the illegal TKP in the 1940s.

[5] Founded in 1992 under the name Socialist Turkey Party (STP), the Party continued its activities as the Socialist Power Party (SİP) after being banned by the Constitutional Court. In 2001, the SİP adopted the historic name Communist Party of Turkey (TKP).

[6] *ibid.*, p.15

[7] *ibid.*, p. 32

[8] *ibid.*, p. 43

[9] PB member Aydan Bulutgil, CC member Ulvi Oğuz, and PB member Aydın Meriç, was removed from his active duties, respectively.

[10] At the 5th Congress held in April 1983, Yağcı (Kutlu) became general secretary, while a position of general chairperson was created for İsmail Bilen. Bilen would pass away in November 1983 at the age of 81.

[11] Kerim Seyran, *Türkiye'deki gerici diktatörlüğü neden 'faşist' olarak nitelendirmiyoruz?* (Why don't we describe the reactionary dictatorship in Turkey as 'fascist?'), no-date (TÜSTAV TKP Kitaplığı list. Publication date: 1982), p.10.

TÜSTAV is a foundation established to preserve the party archives during the legal dissolution of the TBKP. Later continuing its activities with historical research, TÜSTAV has an archive containing numerous sources and documents that can be accessed online.

[12] Turgut Özal, former President and Prime Minister of Turkey, associated with the country's neoliberal transformation in the 1980s -t. n.

[13] *ibid.*, p.12

[14] The archive of the Kurtuluş newspaper, published in Germany during those years, is not available at TÜSTAV.

[15] The first example is the decision to move the party headquarters from Baku to Ankara, the center of the National Struggle, after it was established in Baku. Despite Bolshevik leaders considering this decision by the TKP to be risky, at the very least, the leadership under Mustafa Suphi took responsibility and overruled the persistent objections. The majority of the TKP's Central Committee members would be killed upon their return to the country in January 1921.

The Magazine *Ortaklaşa* (Collectively) Sets out *For Equality, Freedom and the Republic*



Aşkın Süzük,

Member of TKP Party Council

TKP has begun publishing a new monthly magazine designed as a political and ideological tool for struggle, in line with the political requirements of the coming period.

The journal *Ortaklaşa* (Collectively), published by TKP, reached its readers with its first issue in October. Released under the slogan

“For equality, freedom, and the Republic,” the magazine will be published monthly. Each issue will feature detailed articles evaluating a specific topic, as well as current political commentary.

The first issue of the magazine addressed the topic of the Republic within its historical and contemporary political contexts. In particular, following recent regional tensions and imperialism’s new moves in the Middle East, the fundamental references of the Republic established in 1923 began to be debated alongside the new process initiated with PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and DEM Party. The magazine includes a comprehensive dossier evaluating current debates on topics ranging from the borders of the Republic of Turkey to the Treaty of Lausanne. It also features assessments of prominent issues on the national and international agenda, including the disintegration of the “state reasoning” and the İmamoğlu case.

What Is the Goal of Ortaklaşa?

The *Ortaklaşa* magazine will be a significant tool in making visible and politicizing the republican and enlightenment legacy in Turkey, which has been suppressed and attempted to be dissipated throughout AKP’s rule.

One of the fundamental intentions of the capitalist class and its representative, AKP, for years has been to dismantle resistance to the reactionary wave in the country. Together, they have sought to distance segments of society that defend egalitarian values against the domination of holding companies, independence against imperialism, and enlightenment against reactionary forces from this line. Attacks on the fundamental references of the Republic, established in 1923 as a historic step forward after victory over occupation, and on the social values that shaped that process, have become more systematic and violent under the AKP government. A significant dimension of these attacks has been the spread of anti-communism in our country and the prevention of segments embracing these enlightenment values from coming together with socialist thought.

The *Ortaklaşa* magazine will make a significant contribution to TKP's long-standing effort to energize and strengthen the segments of society that uphold and embrace the progressive values of the Republic. The magazine aims to enable these segments to evaluate important political and social developments in Turkey and around the world through informed discussions, while also

preventing attempts to reform the system from within.

In Turkey, significant shifts and fractures are occurring in society's political and ideological references due to internal and external shifts. TKP, whose political influence is growing in the country, aims to strengthen its struggle and intervention by publishing an effective printed publication under these conditions. The *Ortaklaşa*, intended for widespread distribution, will become one of the TKP's primary organizational tools. The first issue of the journal, which was welcomed with great enthusiasm, was widely distributed, particularly in neighborhoods where TKP's District Houses are located and in universities.

Long-Standing and Distinguished Publishing Tradition of TKP

TKP has an effective and assertive publishing tradition in Turkey. TKP's theoretical periodical, *Gelenek*, started to be published in 1986, and is still in print today. During the period when real socialism began to collapse, heavy liberal attacks began to open gaps in the intellectual and political positions of socialism around the world. At that time, while the role of the proletariat in the struggle for social liberation and socialism was being debated, attempts

were being made to reconcile socialism with the idea of the free market. As in the rest of the world, illusions and deviations deepened within the socialist and communist movement in Turkey, and Gelenek intervened strongly against this disintegration with a fierce political and ideological response.

The soL magazine, which was first published monthly and then weekly by TKP in 1998, was launched with the aim of promoting the principles and values of the left among society and uniting intellectuals around a common intellectual endeavor. soL began online publishing in 2006 and subsequently evolved into a news portal that is still active today.

The magazine *Ortaklaşa*, first issue was published in October, will continue TKP's tradition of print publishing as the party's primary tool for political and ideological intervention.

Ortaklaşa journal announced its launch with this piece;

We publish a new magazine **ORTAKLAŞA** (COLLECTIVELY);

In our country, where a handful of capitalists monopolize all wealth and our citizens live in poverty, against labor exploitation, against the privileges of the rich, and

FOR EQUALITY...

In our country, where the state serves the rich and the rule of law has been replaced by mob rule and the law of the jungle, against oppression, against the lies that poison our minds, **FOR FREEDOM...**

In our country, where religious fundamentalism is used to legitimize all the filth of the system, against sectarianism, against the immunity of religious orders, **FOR SECULARISM...**

In our country, dominated by wealthy individuals dependent on imperialism but whose ambitions exceed their capabilities, against war mongering, against the opening of our borders for debate, **FOR INDEPENDENCE...**

In our country, where the ruling class and all political structures serving them are united in their hostility toward the Republic, against Neo-Ottomanism, against ethnic discrimination and separatism,

FOR A NEW REPUBLIC...

To find remedies to our common problems **COLLECTIVELY**, we took up our pens for a **SOCIALIST REPUBLIC BELONGING TO THE WORKING CLASS.**

ORTAKLAŞA, belongs to all of us.

Highlights from Turkish Foreign Policy



Breaking Down the U.S. Tour

October began with rapid developments on the foreign policy front, following the momentum of the late-September UN meetings. Former U.S. President Donald Trump's hostile tone during the UN sessions had already been foreshadowed in August, when Washington revoked the visas of Palestinian representatives -while at the same time granting entry to Sharaa, the former "terrorist" now presented as Syria's leader, to make his debut on the UN stage.

President Erdoğan was also in New York for the UN General Assembly, where he held several meetings, including a closed-door session with

Trump - his first White House visit in six years. Meanwhile in Turkey, Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the far-right MHP and Erdoğan's unofficial coalition partner, had called for a Turkey-Russia-China alliance. When asked about this upon his arrival in New York, Erdoğan vaguely replied, "Honestly, I haven't been able to follow that... let's hope for the best."

The Price of a White House Meeting

Ahead of the visit, Erdoğan issued a presidential decree lifting additional tariffs on certain U.S. products - just the tip of the iceberg when it came to the cost of securing a face-to-face meeting at the White House. Main opposition leader Özgür Özel (CHP) revealed a phone call between Erdoğan and Eric Trump concerning a Boeing deal allegedly tied to arranging the meeting. Turkish Airlines (THY) reportedly plans to purchase 225 new aircraft worth \$40 billion, with 150 firm orders and 75 options.

The Trump-Erdoğan meeting agenda was not limited to aviation. A possible return to the F-35 program and alternative defense arrangements were also discussed. The AKP government has loudly promoted its "domestic and national" KAAN fighter jet project, which has completed two test flights and is expected to enter mass production in the mid-2030s. However, KAAN

currently uses the U.S.-made F110 engine - the same engine used in F-16s - meaning dependence on the U.S. continues.

During the visit, Hakan Fidan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, publicly noted that Ankara was awaiting U.S. approval for the KAAN engine exports. When a cabinet member admitted that Turkey could not produce the jet without U.S. cooperation, this contradicted years of nationalist rhetoric and provoked immediate pushback within the government. Defense Industries President Haluk Görgün responded by claiming that efforts to develop a domestic engine were “progressing as planned,” and that the future of the defense of Turkey was not dependent on any single country. The contradiction between these two senior officials encapsulates how policymaking often works within the AKP: both statements are partly true - and both mislead the public.

The Turkish defense industry has indeed achieved important milestones, expanding its production capacity and taking on ambitious projects. Yet, as the KAAN case illustrates, the country’s place in the imperial hierarchy remains decisive. So long as Turkey’s sovereignty rests within NATO structures and its economy relies on foreign capital, it

is unrealistic to expect a fully “domestic and national” arms sector.

There has also been talk of a new nuclear investment project, though it remains unclear whether this refers to small modular reactors or a full-scale plant. Combined with other deals, these projects could bring over \$100 billion in profits to U.S. corporations.

On the eve of the White House meeting, Turkey announced long-term LNG purchase agreements with Mercuria Energy and Woodside Energy for roughly 76 billion cubic meters of gas, primarily from U.S. facilities. This move was not just a gesture of goodwill — it was also a calculated effort to temper Trump’s demands. During their joint press event, Trump openly criticized Turkey’s ongoing energy relations with Russia.

When Erdoğan took the floor, he pledged to “do everything in our power to reopen the Theological School on Heybeliada.” The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate has long lobbied for this reopening. While the topic may seem unrelated, it becomes clearer when viewed in the context of religious influence: the Russian Orthodox Church’s political weight makes such gestures toward the Greek Patriarchate strategically relevant.

Trump, in turn, remarked: “The best thing Erdoğan can do is not buy oil and gas from Russia.” Since the EU banned most seaborne Russian oil in early 2023, Turkey has become one of Moscow’s largest fossil fuel customers, importing over \$90 billion worth of oil, coal, and gas since January 2023.

In the weeks after the White House meeting, Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar responded to U.S. calls to halt Russian imports, stating that Turkey’s priority was “energy supply security,” and that trade with Russia would continue accordingly. Bayraktar clarified that imports of Russian crude and petroleum products were conducted by the private sector, not the state. Nonetheless, conflicting reports suggest that Turkey aims to meet more than half its gas demand through domestic production and U.S. LNG imports by 2028 - supposedly reducing reliance on Iran and Russia.

However, given that Bayraktar recently admitted delays in Black Sea gas production and effectively abandoned claims in the Eastern Mediterranean, the shortfall in “domestic supply” will almost certainly be covered by the public budget.

A further dimension concerns Iran: Turkey’s gas contract with Tehran expires in mid-2026, and

renewal under similar terms appears unlikely. Iran currently supplies around 10 billion cubic meters of gas annually. A July report from the National Intelligence Academy - one of Turkey's most influential state institutions - emphasized the importance of siding with Israel in any potential conflict with Iran, making the political orientation behind these energy decisions clearer. Notably, shortly after the White House meeting, Erdoğan issued a decree freezing the assets of several Iranian individuals and entities linked to Iran's nuclear program.

Meanwhile, the U.S. and Turkey signed a new agreement to enhance cooperation in civil nuclear energy. Minister Bayraktar described it as "a process that will further deepen the long-standing and multidimensional partnership between Turkey and the U.S.," adding that the two sides aim to cooperate in constructing nuclear power plants. Details of the Strategic Civil Nuclear Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding remain undisclosed, but it is expected to involve U.S. participation in Turkey's future nuclear projects - seen as a counterbalance to the Russian-owned Akkuyu plant, whose first reactor is scheduled to go online in 2025.

Following the White House talks on energy and defense, reports suggested Ankara now intends

to cooperate with Western partners - particularly the U.S. - rather than Russia and China, to exploit Central Anatolia's vast rare-earth reserves. Turkey joined the Mineral Security Partnership last year, a U.S.-EU initiative to reduce dependence on China in rare-earth supply chains. Reliable sources confirm that negotiations between Ankara and Washington for joint field operations are already underway.

Erdoğan's trip ultimately produced a multibillion-dollar purchase agreement - but what did Turkey gain in return? Former Ambassador and Special Envoy Tom Barrack offered an unvarnished answer: when asked about Erdoğan's goals, he said, "What he needs isn't the S-400s or the F-16s - it's legitimacy."

Using the UN General Assembly Platform: Solidarity with Palestine or Praise for Trump?

President Erdoğan's address to the 80th UN General Assembly focused heavily on Palestine, even as he ignored coalition partner Bahçeli's call to issue a "final warning" to Israel before the world's leaders.

Despite Erdoğan's emphasis, when Trump was asked if they shared a common stance on Israel, he replied, "I don't know his position. I can't tell you about that," before adding that he wanted to "get Gaza over with" and that "great progress"

was being made. During their earlier meeting, Trump reportedly promised regional leaders that he would not permit Prime Minister Netanyahu to annex the West Bank.

In a Fox News interview that evening, Erdoğan called the meeting “productive” but offered no details. Shortly thereafter, Trump unveiled his 20-point Gaza plan, following the travel of İbrahim Kalın, Chief of the National Intelligence Organization of Turkey (MIT), traveled to Qatar to participate in mediation talks. According to Yediot Aharonot Newspaper, Kalın played a key role, pressing Hamas to accept the plan under threat of losing all external support. Trump later thanked Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt for helping achieve “this incredible result,” praising Erdoğan for taking “a personal interest in Hamas.”

Following Trump’s boast to the Israeli Knesset – “We gave you lots of weapons. You used them well. The world now loves Israel again” – the leaders of Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey signed a Gaza declaration of intent in Cairo. Trump’s earlier claim of not knowing Erdoğan’s stance on Israel thus acquired new meaning.

How about Syria?

At the UN, Erdoğan also addressed Syria, saying: “We will support the vision of a united Syria, free from terrorism -especially ISIS- and with full

security, using all our capabilities.” Though he did not name them, this was a clear reference to the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Meanwhile, within Turkey, the powerful religious sect İsmailağa has reportedly begun organizing activities in Syria - an irony not lost on observers.

Trump also commented on Syria during his meeting with Erdoğan, saying: “I think President Erdoğan is responsible for the successful overthrow of Syria’s former leader. He won’t take credit for it, but it’s a great achievement.” If meant seriously, this would imply that Ankara effectively handed Syria to Israel - an absurd proposition in itself.

Unfazed, Erdoğan thanked Trump for his mediation in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict and expressed support for U.S. and Qatari efforts in Africa, saying: “We hope the conflicts in eastern Congo will be resolved. We sincerely support the mediation led by the United States and facilitated by Qatar.”


This display of gratitude also appeared to compensate for Erdoğan’s earlier comments on Fox News (September 22), where he had quipped: “If you recall, Mr. Trump said, ‘I will end the Russia-Ukraine war.’ Has it ended? No. He said, ‘I will end the Gaza war.’ Has it ended? No.” The next day, U.S. Secretary of State Marco

Rubio responded sharply, saying on Fox News: “All these countries -including Turkey- come to us begging to be involved. They say what they want publicly, but at the end of the day, they come to the White House asking President Trump to fix things.”

In Turkey, such remarks would likely result in prosecution -yet Erdoğan’s team hurried to explain that his words had been “taken out of context,” reaffirming their loyalty to the Trump administration.



Violence Against Women and Femicides



421 FEMICIDES HAVE BEEN RECORDED

Unfortunately, femicides in Turkey have been on the rise each year. 2024, in particular, saw femicides reach record levels. A total of 421 femicides were committed in Turkey in 2024, with an additional 77 women's deaths recorded as suspicious. Of the women who lost their lives, 201 were married, 137 were single, 15 were only religiously married while the marital status of the remaining 68 is unknown. Yearly statistics indicate that the average age of the murdered women was 35.

THE MURDER SCENE: MOSTLY AT HOME

Most murders take place at home. 239 women were killed in their own homes, 38 women were killed at workplaces and 86 women were killed

in public settings in plain sight. Moreover, a protection order was in place at the time 20 women were killed. Figures show that children are also targeted in cases of familial femicide. In 2024, 19 girls were killed by their fathers, 9 of which were killed along with their mothers.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON THE RISE

In Turkey, one in four university graduate young people is unemployed, while nearly half are unable to practise their profession, instead working outside their fields. Factors such as difficulty finding a job, low wages or prolonged job searches drive young people toward insecure, unregistered work outside their fields of expertise.

THE MOST COMMON MURDER WEAPON: FIREARMS

More than 75% of women were killed by firearms or sharp/bladed instruments, around 15% by asphyxiation, 4% by being thrown from a height and 6% by other methods. Reports show that a large portion of the perpetrators were previous or current partners.

Due to insufficient data, the employment status of the murdered women could not be identified clearly. But certain research indicates



that an apparent common factor among the perpetrators is unemployment and highlights women's participation rates in the workforce.

According to the figures from 2024, 49.98% of Turkey's population is women. Meanwhile, when the rates of employment for women and men with different educational levels are examined, it is clear that the rate of employment is noticeably low for women with no higher education.

Furthermore, the pay gap in gross salaries between women and men with the same level of education clearly reveals the economic inequality women experience.



Okuyan's latest book Revolution has now been released in English

The English edition of Revolution, the latest book by Kemal Okuyan, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), has just been published. The digital access to the book will soon be announced through TKP's official accounts.

TKP delegation was in Cuba for Granma-Rebelde Festival and bilateral meetings with PCC

A delegation from the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), headed by General Secretary Kemal Okuyan, visited Cuba to participate in the festival celebrating the 60th anniversaries of Granma -the official publication of the Communist Party of Cuba- and Juventud Rebelde -the publication of the Young Communist League of Cuba. The full [text of Kemal Okuyan's speech](#), delivered at one of the festival's two panels, which focused on the theme "Another World Is Possible." has been published on TKP's website.

The longstanding fraternal relations between TKP and the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) have been further reinforced through a newly signed cooperation protocol between two parties. Signed by Kemal Okuyan, TKP General Secretary, and Roberto Morales Ojeda, Political Bureau Member and Secretary of Organization of the PCC Central Committee, the protocol outlines collaboration in a wide range of areas—from ideological struggle and communication to cadre training—reflecting the shared commitment of both parties to a common struggle.

New monthly magazine from TKP for equality, freedom, and the republic

The first issue of the monthly magazine *Ortaklaşa* (Collectively) has been published. The magazine will pursue an editorial line that stands with the working class, embraces the universal principles of communist thought, and upholds the progressive values of Turkey's founding revolution and Republic.

The magazine features comprehensive reports evaluating current debates ranging from the borders of the Republic of Turkey to the Treaty of Lausanne. In addition, readers can expect provocative articles that pave the way for progressive thinking in Turkey on topics dominating the national and international agenda, such as the fragmentation of state rationality and the İmamoğlu case.



TKP organisations marched for the republic of the working people

On Sunday, October 26, as the anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic in Turkey approaches, the People's Representatives Assembly of Turkey (THTM), founded in 2023, organised mass public marches across various cities this Sunday. Mass participation from TKP organisations were realized in the marches with the slogan of "we will build the republic of the working people."



TKP's response to the Erdoğan-Trump meeting

In the statement regarding the meeting between Erdoğan and Trump, TKP declared: "Our country's interests will not be begged for at the White House gate!"

The statement emphasized that AKP's only item on the table was to surrender and open the country's resources to the plunder. The statement also noted that the swamp of Neo-Ottomanist fantasies is the work of the AKP. And the United States -with its billion-dollar "rescue" deals- is not the way out, but the swamp itself.

[Read the whole statement](#)

TKP also has called for a demonstration in front of the US Embassy in Ankara, to say,

“Get out - and take your friends with you!”

In the demonstration, it was pointed out that representatives of holding companies and sects have sold out the country for their own interests, and our nation’s fate now rests on what comes out of Trump’s mouth.

“Let the collaborators of imperialism brag about their visits; we know that these multi-billion-dollar deals will be borne on the backs of workers.”

Joint concerts with KKE honoring Theodorakis’s 100th birthday



Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) and the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) organized joint events in the name of the 100th anniversary of the birth of the great Greek composer and communist Mikis Theodorakis, in the both sides of the Aegean; the island of Chios and the city of İzmir.

TKP General Secretary Kemal Okuyan and KKE Political Bureau member Nikos Sofianos addressed the large crowd gathered in İzmir.

In the events, both Greek and Turkish musicians performed presenting Theodorakis' compositions, with the emphasis on building an equal and brotherly system on both sides of the Aegean.

Solidarity visit to Lebanon

TKP took part in the events organized by the Lebanese Communist Party in Beirut to mark the anniversary of the founding of the Lebanese National Resistance Front.

Speaking at the mass rally alongside LCP General Secretary Hanna Gharib, TKP Party Council member Yiğit Günay addressed the gathering on behalf of the Communist Party of Turkey, underlining the class dimension of the ongoing developments in the region and saluting the resistance of the peoples of Palestine and Lebanon.

TKP Central Committee also issued a [statement](#) after Israel's unlawful attack on the Sumud Flotilla.

“The Palestinian people, resisting with unwavering determination against one of the most barbaric genocidal assaults in human history, together with the millions across the world who stand with this just resistance, are the clearest witnesses not to Israel's strength but to its cowardice and lawlessness.”

