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# WHERE IS TURKEY HEADED?





# Where Is Turkey Headed?

**Kemal Okuyan** – *TKP General Secretary*



When the AKP came to power 23 years ago, many, both in Turkey and abroad, could not grasp our argument that the AKP would eventually challenge the Republic. This is not referring to those who saw the AKP as a democratic project or even to those who claimed Erdoğan and his allies were carrying out a national democratic revolution. Many organizations and intellectuals from various leftist factions harshly criticized the TKP for this stance.

What were we supposed to understand from “reckoning with the Republic”?

To answer, we must consider the forces that brought the AKP to power. This includes the big monopolies represented by TÜSİAD, the US and European imperialist countries, Islamist movements (especially the Muslim Brotherhood), and reactionary regional powers like Qatar. Together, they formed a powerful coalition with clear class interests.

However, the AKP differed from many previous parties serving the capitalist class and NATO in one crucial aspect: It was

an ideological party, strongly opposed to secularism, which was a defining feature of the 1923 Republic. Additionally, it mobilized a conservative social base, including radical Islamists. This gave the AKP significant mass support for whatever actions it took.

The expectations for the AKP were:

**1.** To remove legal barriers to multinational monopolies operating in Turkey.

**2.** To neutralize the working class through policies like flexible production, de-unionization, and subcontracting.

**3.** To privatize the public sector, which had long been dominant.

**4.** To use the EU accession process (which would never happen) as a pretext for these economic shifts.

**5.** To abolish secularism, facilitating the Islamization of society.

**6.** To create ideological and cultural justifications for Turkey's involvement in imperialist actions in the Middle East, particularly Iraq, Iran, and Syria.

**7.** To shift foreign policy towards a more active, aggressive stance, aligning with capitalist expansion and US interests.

**8.** To strengthen ties with Israel and reconsider NATO's role in the Black Sea.

**9.** To redefine the Kurdish issue through policies like localization and autonomy, while taking a guardianship role over Kurds in Iraq, Syria, and Iran.

The AKP succeeded in drawing support from a significant portion of the left in Turkey and the Kurdish nationalist movement by blaming the Republic and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk for Turkey's 20th-century history of coups and massacres. This strategy, whether mistaken or perhaps even a betrayal, played a key role in limiting opposition to the AKP, despite the fact that Turkish people faced a massive imperialist attack.

This approach is similar to blaming the French Revolution for the crimes of French imperialism. It is crucial to understand this historical context to grasp the current situation in Turkey. While this capitalist assault periodically sparks mass reactions, it also creates deep shifts in the ideological patterns that have shaped Turkish society since the Republic's founding.

These reactions, which do not take on the character of a working-class movement



despite the widespread participation of the working people due to the disorganization of the working class and the non-existence of the trade union movement, express themselves mostly with symbols and historical references.

The new solution process initiated by the AKP and the fascist party, MHP, with the Kurdish nationalist movement PKK and DEM Party in the legal sphere has led to the positioning of some sections of Turkish nationalists against the AKP on one side and to the distancing of a wide section of anti-AKP groups from the Kurdish nationalist movement on the other.

A large portion of youth, frustrated by the left's focus on the Kurdish issue and the liberal media's portrayal of Turkish identity as shameful, has joined recent protests, emphasizing their "Turkish" identity. These protests are distinct from traditional nationalism, with minimal instances of racism and have a strong secular orientation with a hatred to wealthy sectors of the society.

Many of these youth, from families in the AKP's conservative base, are beginning to

engage with revolutionary-socialist ideas. However, they lack a clear, stable ideological direction. The political and ideological landscape in Turkey has been in flux since the 2023 earthquake, with significant changes continuing to unfold.

The AKP has tried to create a new order by blending Islamic Neo-Ottomanism with secular Neo-Ittihadism. This has created a country with new borders, ambitions, political structures, and ideologies. Resistance to this new order exists both within the system and in society, and Turkey's political situation is increasingly chaotic. The moves of the Trump administration further complicate this process.

The TKP aims to prevent Turkey's working class from falling into nationalist and even racist ideologies, offering a socialist alternative rooted in anti-capitalism, solidarity between Turkish and Kurdish workers, and a commitment to the Republic. This is one of the TKP's core tasks today—ensuring that the historically rooted republican values align with the socialist goal. In recent weeks, TKP has demonstrated its capacity to lead in this struggle.

# Why Did TKP Break Away From the Left?

**Cansu Oba**

*Member of TKP Central Committee*

Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) has long had a tense relationship with the broader left in Turkey. This tension originates from the foundational philosophy of TKP\* and its departure point.

TKP was built on the political and theoretical line articulated in Gelenek ("Tradition"), a theoretical journal launched in 1986. But Gelenek was more than just a publication—it was the ideological groundwork for a communist party.

The opening paragraph of the first issue's preface reveals much:

*"Gelenek does not set out with the aim of*


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*\*TKP, founded on September 10, 1920, has a history marked by discontinuities. The precursor party, the Socialist Rule Party (SİP), challenged the legal ban on founding a party with "communist" in its name in 2001 and reclaimed the name TKP. This reintroduced the Communist Party of Turkey to politics and the working class, a name that is now permanently restored. TKP recognizes 1920 as its foundation year, symbolizing both its roots and its endorsement of the communist movement's history as a whole.*

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*unifying the left in Turkey or building a platform to that end. Gelenek's self-defined mission can be summarized as follows: Under current conditions, to help reinvigorate the left in Turkey with a new spirit, vitality, and creativity."*



At that time, only six years had passed since the fascist coup of September 12, 1980. The left in Turkey had suffered immense repression inside, and conditions abroad were equally grim, with the Soviet Union heading toward dissolution.

The coup did more than imprison, torture, and kill socialist militants—it aimed to erase socialism and revolutionary ideals, which had gained significant traction in society during the 1970s. Unfortunately, it largely succeeded. The 1982 Constitution, drafted after the coup, retained its oppressive character even after several amendments and pave the way for today's conditions.

Meanwhile, the Kurdish nationalist movement was beginning to rise.

In these circumstances, the left in Turkey retreated from its revolutionary stance.



Disillusioned with revolution, many leftist groups sought alliances within the existing political system, making excuses each time. Core principles like anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism, and secularism eroded, replaced by strategic compromises. Leftist movements increasingly aligned with the main bourgeois opposition (CHP) and the Kurdish nationalist DEM Party.

From this perspective, TKP's break from the left is, in fact, a break not from the left, but from bourgeois politics. In recent months, TKP has explicitly distanced itself from the "cluster of lefts" in which it was objectively included, due to their increasing alignment with bourgeois politics.

This decision was clearly formalized in the Political Report of the 14th Congress of TKP in September 2024, where the following was stated:

*"The Communist Party of Turkey completely rejects the simplistic approach of "fighting the Palace regime" observed in the polarization within bourgeois politics. It distances itself from a "left" that opens a covert or overt credit to European imperialists in terms of democracy and freedoms, a "left" that believes in the nonsense of good sect-bad sect, sees TÜSİAD as a modern and progressive element within capital, and adopts*

*a growth strategy under the wings of the CHP or Kurdish political movement. The party operates on the truth that the greatest favor to the vibrant, revolutionary elements within the “left” is to strengthen an independent line, encouraging them to break away. In this context, the party prominently highlights its communist character and put aside the hollow “left” concept.”*

TKP’s decision followed efforts to promote collaboration with some leftist parties in areas like publishing and social organizations. These attempts aimed to create a revolutionary political line independent of bourgeois parties. However, they faltered when, during the 2023 elections, these parties failed to maintain independence from the CHP and DEM Party. The anti-Erdoğan “one-man regime” discourse, which dominated for years, masked the role of capital, diverting leftist focus back to actors and parties within the system.

At each critical moment, the left’s retreat—yielding its positions to bourgeois narratives—didn’t just weaken its immediate standing but legitimized bourgeois politics and undermined the working class’s independence.

Yet the true path to growth and influence lies in sharpening the principles that separate



the left from bourgeois forces and in becoming a truly independent political focal itself. From this point of view, abandoning the label of “left” marks a struggle that is won—not defeated .

With the political and social issues it brings to the agenda, TKP is distancing itself from the left, which has long been disconnected from the historical mission of communists and unable to move beyond the struggle for democracy, peace, and freedoms. This distancing does not mean that TKP is becoming sectarian or isolated. On the contrary, it enables the Party to engage more effectively with broader segments of the working class.

By stepping away from a diluted left that has lumped the struggle against exploitation together with various identity-based movements, communists strengthen their role as legitimate actors of a just struggle that is as rooted in these lands as it is universal.





# Why Are Trade Unions In Turkey No Longer Schools for the Working Class?

**Alpaslan Savaş,**

Member of TKP Central Committee

The fascist coup of September 12, 1980, was the most far-reaching attack on the organized struggle of Turkey's working class. It ushered in a period of repression—unions were shut down, and new laws severely restricted unionization, collective bargaining, and striking. While workers achieved some gains afterward, they never regained the strength and influence of the 1960s and '70s. Over the past 45 years, the union movement has steadily declined,



increasingly shaped by capitalist interests.

Repressive laws after the 1980 coup were not the only reason for the union movement's decline. When progressive unions re-emerged, they were shaped by the post-USSR ideological climate. By the late 1990s, leftist unionism sought recognition as a "social partner" of capital. Under the AKP, it adopted a liberal, pro-EU, identity-focused stance -drifting toward "unionism without workers." KESK (confederation of trade unions – public sector) narrowed its focus to the Kurdish issue, while DISK (confederation of trade unions – private sector) aligned closely with the main bourgeois opposition party. For many, unionism became a path to political office.

This ideological surrender has played as significant a role as repressive policies in weakening unions' ability to act, eroding workplace organization, and drawing them into bourgeois politics. As a result, the efforts of the few union centers that still prioritize workplace-based organizing have little impact on the broader union movement.

Another factor that caused the

ineffectiveness of the union movement in Turkey is the failure to respond to the changes in labor processes and the transformation in the structure of the working class caused by this change. The traditional union model in Turkey, based on regular employment, confined to wage-centric unionism, and whose achievement criteria are determined by uniform labor agreements, has not found a foothold in this regime.

On the other hand, a significant portion of the worker movements in Turkey are still carried out by unionized workers. However, these emerge as individual examples. Even the different resistances by the same unions/union federations do not unite. In this respect, unions stand as an obstacle to a united labor movement.

The most widespread and effective worker response to the decline in real wages and purchasing power in Turkey emerged at the very beginning of 2022. Following the minimum wage increase, workers in certain labor hubs across the country began to mobilize for wage adjustments. Almost all of these actions took the form of workplace resistance by unorganized segments of



workers, outside the framework of the union movement. At the same time, unions, concerned that a potential rise in the minimum wage would disrupt the balance and consensus reached in unionized workplaces, chose to preserve the existing status quo—perhaps even hindering a possible rise in the labor movement from within. This example is not an exception. For quite some time, unions have shown a defensive reflex against developments that could lead to unrest over wage increases in factories and workplaces.

The status-quo-oriented and bureaucratic structure of Turkey's union movement has, in many instances, failed to meet the expectations of workers and has deepened the sense of hopelessness within the working class. In this respect, we must acknowledge that the period when unions served as schools for the working class in Turkey has long since come to an end.

TKP members are active in trade unions, organizing and taking on leading roles. The role of TKP members can be traced in some of the most dynamic and militant unions in the country, particularly in the health, education, metal, and construction sectors.

Unionized TKP members also take part in organizing leading actions and resistance efforts. Although these are indispensable elements of our revolutionary struggle, in order for the working class to have a decisive impact on Turkey's political landscape, we must focus on a much more fundamental issue and carry out a comprehensive effort to rebuild class identity and culture. For this reason, when it comes to working-class organization, the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) prioritizes different objectives rather than channeling all its resources and cadres solely into trade unions.

The 14th Congress of TKP defined this emerging need as "an enlightenment mobilization campaign directed at the working class".



# New Europe, New Army?

## Postwar mayhem in Syria

Turkey's ruling party, AKP, was unsettled by recent events in Syria. The optimism from the end of last year, following regime change and the rise of the group affiliated with AKP, was dampened by three key developments.



First, mass killings by HTS forces against the Alawite population spread worldwide, severely tarnishing the new Syrian regime's image. Although these developments were the subject of so-called criticism by European politicians, in reality they served to legitimize further intervention and penetration in Syria by the imperialist powers such as the USA, and the UK, with Israel playing a particularly prominent role,

and appeared to align closely with broader imperialist strategies. This was concerning for the AKP, which had positioned itself as the mentor of the HTS regime.

The second development was the agreement between HTS and SDF, brokered by the United States to further its imperialistic agenda. This deal, while improving the HTS regime's image, weakened AKP's narrative of controlling Syria. It's important to remember that the SDF was recently labeled a "PKK-affiliated terrorist organization" in Turkey, making their growing influence in Syria difficult for AKP to be easily explained and "sold" to its internal audience.

The third development was increased Israeli aggression towards Syria. Netanyahu's recent declarations on the "perpetuity" of the occupation, along with portrayals of a Turkish threat and recent bombardments of a military base said to be allocated to Turkey's use has further blurred the Syria narrative of AKP. It has become clear that AKP is supposed to act merely as an agent of the US imperialistic game in Syria and had to play its own part without undermining the key interests of Israel.



## **Turkey-US-Israel relations**

Trump-Netanyahu meeting held in the White House on the 8th of April has further strengthened the ailments of AKP in that specific foreign policy matter. It has also serious potential to harm Erdoğan's "anti-imperialistic leader" image throughout the years. Two leaders discourteously and publicly teased the limits of AKP's purportedly ambitious policies in Syria.

Not surprisingly, the same day MFA Fidan gave very moderate messages regarding Israel's political and military actions in Syria. He insisted that Turkey would like to avoid any escalation with Israel, and he even said that the Israeli occupation in Syria is a bilateral problem between these two countries. This discourse was clearly at odds with what Erdoğan kept shouting about Israel on each and every occasion in Turkey.

## **"European Security Architecture"**

In recent weeks we have witnessed the resurgence of an old discussion and its possible effects on Turkey's foreign relations.

US-Russian efforts to reach a kind of "rapprochement" in Ukraine and in other

parts of the world has created havoc in US-Europe relations and gave rise to the idea of a European Defence Community. As several European countries showed restraint to join the venture of “defend Ukraine”, the talks focused on creating a new European Security Architecture.

The United Kingdom has emphasized that Turkey’s inclusion in the Community is crucial, citing two key arguments. First, Turkey’s large army, second only to the US within NATO. This argument has been valid since Turkey joined NATO. The second, more recent argument, is Turkey’s advanced defense industry, particularly in drones, which would strengthen Europe’s military.

Erdoğan’s government hoped the new initiative would boost the EU membership process, at least in appearance, easing public discontent caused by growing poverty. It aimed to enhance the Customs Union for the benefit of the Turkish bourgeoisie and create a positive atmosphere to secure foreign loans for the economy.

## **Effect of recent protests**

The AKP narrative of “a new start with



the EU” was marred by the reactions of France and Germany’s leaders, as well as of the EU officials against the recent actions of the government. EU Commissioner Kos has cancelled her scheduled meeting with Turkish MFA H. Fidan.

Given the EU’s satisfaction with the AKP regime in recent years, it’s unlikely that symbolic gestures will lead to significant actions against Turkey’s ruling party. However, the AKP may become more responsive to European demands to maintain relations. It’s important to remember that despite backing AKP’s neo-Ottomanist ventures, the Turkish ruling class still values strong EU ties, with nearly half of Turkey’s foreign trade conducted with the EU.

# “Justice In Turkey” with Figures

350K

NUMBER OF  
PEOPLE IN PRISON



According to the 2023 Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics, there are approximately **350 thousand** prisoners in Turkey, with a population of 85 million. This means that for every 100 thousand people, 408 are in prison. With this rate, Turkey has by far the highest detention rate in Europe. By comparison, the second highest rate **is in Georgia with 256 people, while** the European average is **123** people.

301

ARRESTS IN  
RECENT PROTESTS



In recent weeks, millions in Turkey have protested to defend their right to vote and to be elected. During these protests, hundreds were detained, with dozens placed under house arrest. According to Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya's March 27, 2025 statement, 1,879 people were detained, and 260 arrested. The number of those in pre-trial detention later rose to **301\*, mostly young people**. Among those detained were **9 TKP members, including the head of TKP's Istanbul organization and a member of the Party Council**. For a better understanding of the absurdity of these numbers, In comparison, only 189 defendants have been convicted for the destruction caused by the February 2023 earthquake, which killed tens of thousands, while 193 remain in pre-trial detention.

*\*A part of 301, including eight TKP members were released in the following weeks*



## 79K OBSTRUCTING THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO INFORMATION

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# 50%

## MINIMUM WAGE AND COST OF LIVING

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According to the 2023-2024 report from the Journalists' Union of Turkey (TGS), at least 14 journalists were imprisoned in a year due to their work. 69 journalists were detained for 153 hours. Additionally, 21 claim cases were filed, **totaling about 3 million TRY (~79K USD)**. Censorship continued, with five websites blocked, 395 articles censored, and 191 removed. The Turkish Radio and TV Supreme Council (RTÜK) imposed fines of around **41 million TRY (~1080K USD)** on media outlets for their reporting.

Just in the last few weeks, several channels have received program/broadcast suspensions and fines for broadcasting the protests. Thus, **the total amount of fines imposed by RTÜK in the first three months of 2025 reached 55 million TRY (~1450K USD)**. 18 journalists were also detained in the scope of the protests.

In Turkey, the minimum wage has become the average wage, with nearly **50% of registered workers** earning it. For **unregistered workers, 83.5% earn below the minimum wage**. Meanwhile, the cost of living continues to rise, and the Turkish Lira depreciates. The minimum wage, announced at 625 USD in January 2025, dropped to 581 USD in just three months, falling below the starvation line of 621 USD.



# 48,1%

## HOW ABOUT "INCOME JUSTICE"?

Turkey has one of the highest income inequality rates in Europe. In 2024, **the wealthiest 20% earned 48.1% of total income**, according to TurkStat/TUIK data.



The average **weekly working hours in Turkey were 44.6**, well above the EU average of 36.1, according to ILO 2023 data.

Most workers in Turkey work longer hours for low wages, leading to high credit card usage and borrowing. Cash usage is also declining, with over 430 million cards in circulation by 2024, including 128 million credit cards. The total card spending reached 12.8 trillion TRY (~338B USD), and the average loan debt per capita was 80,842 TRY (~2.1K USD) as of June 2024.



# 3x

## TURKISH CAPITALISTS ON THE FORBES LIST

Forbes' recently released list of billionaires includes 35 people from Turkey. Their combined wealth is \$79,5 billion. These 35 parasitical bourgeoisie hold **nearly three times the total wealth of the poorest 50 percent of the total population of our country, which corresponds to an average of 42,5 million people.**



# **İmamoğlu: Different Aspects, One Reality**



For the past two weeks, Turkey has witnessed unprecedented crowds flooding the streets. What drove the masses, who had remained largely unmoved even in the face of a deep economic crisis, was a series of moves against Ekrem İmamoğlu, the Mayor of İstanbul.

Seen as the presidential candidate of CHP and Erdoğan's key rival, İmamoğlu's university diploma—a requirement for candidacy—was annulled. Soon after, he was detained on charges of terrorism and corruption, and later arrested for the latter. Who is this political figure mobilizing millions, and why has he become Erdoğan's

strongest challenger?

İmamoğlu is now a political detainee. His arrest follows a clearly politicized judicial process aligned with the AKP's interests. The unlawful detention of an elected mayor undermines the right to vote and be elected—a right secured through decades of struggle. TKP did not prioritize the discussions on the political or ideological stance of İmamoğlu in the very first days. However, understanding his ideological, political, and class-based positions is crucial to grasping the developments.

Ekrem İmamoğlu's political ascent began with his candidacy in the 2017 early mayoral elections for the İstanbul Municipality. His name was put forward to then-CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu by Koç Holding—the country's largest conglomerate representing big capital.

İmamoğlu defeated the AKP candidate in the 2019 local elections. By that time, a growing number of people, especially in major cities, were saying, "Anyone but Erdoğan." Public frustration with the AKP translated into support for the CHP candidate, resulting in İmamoğlu's victory.



After the AKP's objections, the election results were annulled and a rerun ordered. İmamoğlu won the rerun by a larger margin, but the AKP undermined the fundamental right to vote and to be elected. TKP was the first to oppose the rerun, calling it unlawful, recognizing the AKP's pattern of testing public tolerance. İmamoğlu turned the situation into a spectacle, gaining public support as "the man who exposed Erdoğan's game," and gradually increased his political influence.

At the core of İmamoğlu's rise is the growing dominance of individual figures over political parties in Turkey. This shift has been fueled by both the ruling and opposition parties, which have leaned on disorganization of the people, while promoting the illusion that change depends on individual "saviors."

TKP does not and will not support either the CHP or İmamoğlu. On the contrary, it has been consistently critical of him. Still, TKP calls for his release as a defense of the basic right to vote and be elected.

Setting aside the recent political struggle, it is evident that İmamoğlu would not differ significantly from Erdoğan in many respects

as president. Some key questions can help clarify this reality:

**Is İmamoğlu a leftist?** No. He is a right-wing pragmatist from a similar family background. Like his father, he was active in politics through Turgut Özal's pro-capitalist, conservative, and anti-worker party—one that Erdoğan has also praised. His path to the CHP was shaped more by business interests, especially those tied to the construction sector, than by ideology. İmamoğlu supports NATO and the US, and after his arrest, his first article appeared in the New York Times, where he criticized Washington and European governments for not reacting strongly enough to his arrest.

**Is İmamoğlu secular?** This is questionable—not just because he has recited the Qur'an at political events or stayed in religious dorms in his youth, but also due to his actions in office. He began his mayoral term accompanied by an imam, banned alcohol sales and mixed-gender pools in municipal facilities. He has also funneled resources to religious sects, which he describes as having a "deep philosophy." While his lifestyle may appear secular, it doesn't reflect political attitude as a political



figure..

### **Which class does İmamoğlu represent?**

He is part of the capitalist class and stands as a figure of the broader capitalist system. This is reflected in his political stance, international and domestic engagements, his administration's approach to municipal labor disputes, and his response to striking workers.

He has been positioned by powerful segments of capital as a potential replacement for Erdoğan, crafted as an option in times of political uncertainty. In many ways, İmamoğlu mirrors Erdoğan—both in political style and ambition—emerging as a career-oriented, conservative figure shaped by the system he serves.

Despite the positioning of Erdoğan and İmamoğlu as adversaries, the reality is clear: The political, class and ideological lines of both figures are close to each other, but distant from us.





## We Will Not Kneel To the Government

In recent weeks, Turkey has witnessed protests on a scale not seen since the 2013 Gezi Resistance. These protests, sparked by the detention of elected mayors and journalists, saw TKP actively opposing the usurpation of the right to vote and be elected. TKP's efforts continue to push for these reactions to evolve into a broader questioning of capitalism.

### What Has Happened?

The AKP government's attack on the right to vote and be elected, coupled with its efforts to narrow the political space, escalated with the detention and arrest of İmamoğlu, the mayor of İstanbul and



the presidential candidate of CHP, and several journalists. These actions sparked widespread public outrage, fueled by long-standing frustration over impoverishment, and led to mass protests.

The Central Committee of TKP issued a statement immediately following this government assault, urging the people of Turkey to organize against the AKP's tyranny.



[kisa.link/KAyU0](https://kisa.link/KAyU0)

*Full Statement in English:*

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## **Thousands marched with the Party**

In response to the government's attack on the right to vote and be elected, people took to the streets across Turkey, especially



in metropolitan cities. Thousands of citizens marched with the TKP. Public meetings were held in TKP District Houses, discussing the government's loss of governing ability and debating what actions working people should take. Many people applied to join the party during these demonstrations and meetings.

## **Youth is standing up**

The response from university students played a crucial role in keeping the protests alive. The protests, in which the Communist Youth of Turkey was at the forefront, evolved



into a week-long academic boycott. The widespread youth participation is not only a reaction to injustice but also a protest against poverty and a bleak future.

## **It is the bourgeois parties that collaborate with foreign powers**

Erdoğan labeled the protests, supported by large segments of society, as a “foreign



operation” and accused citizens of having “roots abroad”. TKP rebuked this attack, reminding the government that it was they who had made Turkey vulnerable to external operations through the Greater Middle East project, their collusion with the Fethullah Gülen movement (formerly AKP’s ally), and their operations in Syria.



[kisa.link/Ktqz0](https://kisa.link/Ktqz0)

*Full Statement in English:*

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## **We do not bow to unlawful detentions and arrests**



The ruling party’s response to the protests included the unlawful detention of demonstrators, including several TKP members, with arrest warrants for nine. In response, TKP organizations, supported by many citizens, took to the streets in a stronger way. By April 11, eight of the detained TKP members had been released.



## Long Live International Solidarity!

Numerous communist and workers' parties from around the world have expressed solidarity with the Communist Party of Turkey and the current struggle in Turkey, demanding the immediate and unconditional release of the detained TKP members.



## We will not kneel

TKP continued its protests with three consecutive days of mass gatherings under the slogan "We Will Not Kneel to the Government." In the statement of the same name, TKP shared its analysis of the current political climate, the dynamics of the protests, and the recent consumption boycott initiated by the opposition. The Party also responded to remarks made by an AKP official who addressed the demonstrators saying "you will kneel".



[kisa.link/unFhf](https://kisa.link/unFhf)

*Full Statement in English:*



# Busy as always, TÜSİAD?

Throughout the protests, TKP emphasized its “dual responsibility,” stating that it would fight against



confining the people’s anger to the limits of bourgeois politics, while continuing its uncompromising struggle against the AKP.

In this context, with May 1st approaching, TKP has launched a political initiative targeting monopolies -namely Turkey’s largest capital organization, TÜSİAD- which are significantly responsible for the conditions that sparked public outrage but have managed to hide behind the AKP.

During this political campaign protests were held in major cities. TKP publications exposed TÜSİAD and the assets of Turkish capitalists—the wealth they have stolen from the people, the public resources they have appropriated, and their mutually beneficial relationship with the AKP.



[kisa.link/gsuqb](https://kisa.link/gsuqb)

*Full Statement in English:*

