Contribution of CP of Turkey, International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties, November 2007, Minsk,

The following text is the contribution of the Communist Party of Turkey to the International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties, held in November 2007, in the capital of Belarus, Minsk, to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the October Revolution. It is the translation of the first chapter of the book "Anti-thesis on the dissolution of socialism in Soviet Union" written by Kemal Okuyan, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Turkey.

Historical Background

First thesis: "Dissolution of the Soviet Union was inevitable."

Dissolution of the Soviet Union was not inevitable. To assert that it was inevitable means claiming that the historical and honorable struggle to establish socialism in the Soviet Union was unreasonable. The working class movement all around the world, particularly the Russian proletariat, had paid a great cost to contribute to the establishment of socialism in the Soviet Union, to support it and to protect it. In this sense, the thesis that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was inevitable cannot be regarded as a mere claim on the aforementioned historical experience.

The thesis defending that such dissolution was inevitable has been figured in the minds of those who strive to eliminate the links between socialism and revolution, let alone those with hostile feelings against communism.

The socialist constitution was spread on a broad period of time, which was characterized by the social revolution and the succeeding social transformations. Besides, it is obvious that the constitution required a preceding political revolution.

In other words, the historical value of socialism, as an obligatory moment of humanity during the process leading to an egalitarian and free society, in no means trivializes its political content that was shaped by the class struggles. It has been decently dealt in the Marxist literature so far that building socialism will be practiced after the conquest of the political power by the working class, and that the new order cannot flourish in the heart of bourgeois society. However, for any reason, the fact that this obligation is two sided has been neglected in many cases. The fact that socialism needs a revolution is not more important than the fact that revolution in our age needs socialism.

In terms of our subject, the claim that the capitalist class loses its revolutionary character once it seizes the power and, what's more important, that it becomes reactionary, is of great importance. We should add here the fact that dynamics of crisis of capitalism are to the great extent independent from the subjective revolutionary interventions. The revolutionary state emerging in this peculiar moment of meeting and concentration of these dynamics, not only shakes the capitalist rule and lead to a radical disruption in the balance of power among classes, but it also applies a historical force that exceeds the limits of capitalism and tries to transcend it.

It is not obligatory for a revolutionary uprising to point at "socialism" against capitalism; furthermore, we cannot mention such a direction in general. However, revolution is a leap forward, and it cannot be left hanging in the air. For example, it was not only the security concerns as an outcome US threats that led the new revolutionary government in Havana to a new social system and turned Cuba into a socialist perspective in the early 1960's. The Cuban revolution, as declared many times by its leader, diverted to a socialist direction to maintain the revolution. Realization of this direction in an underdeveloped country becomes a technical detail at a point in terms of theory of socialist revolution.

Those who regard the dissolution of socialism in Soviet Union as inevitable are first of all theoretically
inconsistent as they neglect this two-sided link between revolution and socialism. Revolutions do not have the freedom to choose.

The theoretical inconsistency in claiming that the Soviet revolution did not have the chance to evade failure is nothing but political "disbelief in revolution." We have to point out this disbelief before replying to the alleged proofs claiming that the Soviet experience was convicted to dissolution. We know that socialist transformations require pressure, and we highlight what we know in our political theory. Nevertheless, we believe that "revolution" as a historical phenomenon has a character that is independent from subjective preferences. Therefore, it can be said that the Bolsheviks gave the Russian revolution a different direction with political instruments; however, it cannot be claimed that they created this revolution.

Appellation of the Soviet experience as a "desperate case" is nothing but a rejection of all attempts to pave the way for historical development of the working class and its revolutionary representatives.

It can by no means be asserted that the Soviet socialism was convicted to dissolution.

Claiming that Soviet socialism became convicted to dissolution as time passed, on the other hand, can be of certain scientific legitimacy as we observe it after the dissolution; however, validity of such legitimacy on political arena is doubtful. The Marxist takes sides, the Marxist cannot be desperate; the dissolution was in no means inevitable.

Second thesis: "The nature of Bolshevism and socialism is incompatible."

Some claim that Bolshevism, under the conditions in Russia, was convenient for seizing the power, but that it is an "unfortunate" political movement with regards to constitution of socialism. This claim should be questioned both theoretically and historically. Theoretically, this claim tears apart the link between the phenomenon of "power" and the socialist construction process. The "political power" is the absolute beginning point in the process of socialist revolution. This not only stems from the fact that in the socialist revolutionary process, conquest of the political power should precede the social revolution; but it also results from the fact that the party leading the working class in the socialist construction process does not rely on any (whatever) social support but on the social powers who were the actors of the revolutionary uprising before the seizure of the power. Although it is clear that the working class party will struggle on different grounds and through different tools before and after the revolution, there is yet a continuity between the political movement "seizing the power" and that "preparing for the socialist construction."

To confirm the practice of Bolshevism before the revolution while claiming it had no chance at "power", one should leave aside this continuity and regard "conquest of the power" as an ordinary action, or mere conspiracy in many cases. Conception of the socialist construction process with this point of view is another matter of debate. So, there is no need for enforcements, lapses and interventions which were deemed obligatory during the conquest of the power!

No, the period between 1917-1945 during the history of bolshevism beginning in 1902-03 is not less valuable than the period before the revolution; if bolshevism is to be seen as a political style in the regard of communists, dissolution of socialism cannot be an evidence for incompatibility of this style with the constitution process. What is to be written under the title of "bolshevism" as a reason for dissolution of socialism in the Soviet Union is the fact that this style was abandoned much earlier than required in the USSR.

Bolshevism and the "October path" that it has led the Russian revolution in, as all agree, is a historical rupture where the "subjective" factor has adequately met the need for this factor. The Russian revolution, if it were left to drift in its way, would end up with a counter-revolution, or would be taken under control via a foreign intervention or, in the most optimist possibility, would be attenuated. However, revolution, as I stated above, was seeking for more. Bolshevism supplied the necessary perspective for such a demand.

However the need to give the revolution a socialist character in order to make it survive was the reality even after 1917 and it was clearly seen that it would not happen by itself. Bolshevism for a long time put forward itself as the "subjective" factor and protected the Soviet power that would evolve into a capitalist restoration when left to take its own course, thus preventing it from betraying to its own constructional philosophy. Those defending that the socialist construction should be entrusted to the ideological accumulation emerging during the conquest of the political power and that conquest entrusted to its masses have always defended "ouvrierism" and blamed those stressing "leadership" and "intervention" for being "substitutionist" by creating a fairy tail on the ability of the masses to act always in conscious. It is clear that the exploitative and repressive mechanisms of capitalism and the lessons taken from the struggles against these mechanisms are not enough to revive a revolutionary feeling among the laboring masses, let alone guarantying a correct political line for them.

It should be remembered in this regard questions that were new but no less important emerged after the revolution. As long as construction of socialism means creating a new life and working classes seizing their own destiny, it is observed that the tension between the historical and the contemporary gains a whole new dimension. All pedagogical attempts to ensure wider masses supporting the socialist construction process, all mechanisms of participation have an alienating impact on the working class.

Bolshevism had a tradition that enabled it to establish such a relationship between leading politics and organization and the workers' masses in a way to prevent the abovementioned dangers. Undermining the role of this tradition in the socialist construction process paved the way for dissolution of the system.

The claim that bolshevism eliminated its very own foundation, even during the moments when it restricted the creative energy of wide masses and thus ensured the socialist direction, is ungrounded. Above all, it has never occurred that the masses created a revolutionary project without a leading actor. Humanity has waited longer than enough in this regard, and it has given enough time to capitalism and its societies. Besides, it is clear that every step forward has a cost. One could not expect from a man thirsty in the middle of desert to test the hygiene of the water resources. Waiting for death is the most inhumane behavior possible. The correct thing is to resist and then face the consequences of resistance.

In this sense, there was/is a chance that bolshevism, which we shall define as an intervention peculiar to leading revolutionary politics and life, could render the masses inert and lead to bureaucratization, as frequently suggested; however, this is only a possibility. In this sense, it would be incorrect to say that there was (already) a natural incompatibility between the Bolshevik experience and socialism.

Third thesis: "The Russian soil was never convenient for socialism."

Emergence of a revolutionary crisis in Russia cannot be explained only with the internal dynamics of that country. Not only development is uneven in the imperialist world, but also the contradictions are accumulated unevenly and are distributed in different concentrations in different countries and geographies. The series of events that led Russia to October 1917 can be explained with the course of class struggle in the Russian scales and with effects on Russia of the crisis of imperialism that reached its peak with the World War I. These are not the same things and can be handled individually on different levels of abstraction. Nevertheless they cannot be separated from each other; one cannot exist without the other and cannot avoid influencing each other.

In this sense, there is a direct relation between the maturation of revolutionary crisis in Russia and the rise of the revolutionary process on the world and its maturation for a rupture. All around the world, yet particularly in Europe after 1915, a "new order" imposed itself, and the objective conditions pressed for transcendence of capitalism in a revolutionary way. The October Revolution was a subjective door opening upon this objectivity. Once this door was opened, it becomes harder to make evaluations based on the "objective conditions."

Russia was not a small, trivial and ineffective country. It was not a country isolated from the revolutionary process on the world, not giving or taking anything to/from it. It is meaningless at a point to demonstrate Russia as an "underdeveloped" arm and hence lacking the necessary infrastructure for socialism, while it was the "outstanding" arm during a period when the world's revolutionary process was on the rise. Even if it was clear that Russia was no like Germany, Britain or France at that time, it can be asserted that it is at a "developed" point than these countries at some points in terms of objective energy required by socialist constitution and feasibility of this energy.

However, the right thing to do is avoiding evaluation of any revolutionary power completely basing it on "objective" criteria once it has emerged.

Here, we cannot ignore the fact that the concepts "underdeveloped" and "developed" are disputable. The criteria or the set of criteria we base our use of the concept is very important. As the number of the criteria that stand as a source to our evaluation rise, the weight and precision of the concepts "underdeveloped-developed" decrease. The economical criteria in the use of these concepts prevail, as when we call a country "underdeveloped", people think of economical indications. Nevertheless, despite "confidential" support of quantitative amplitude, these indications can frequently divert us from reality. Besides, the transitivity between economical levels and other levels, and even at an attempt for abstraction with ignoring this transitivity, it should be remembered that the determination of economy is "in the final analysis."

Going back to the Russian example, we should see the oddness in claims of "assuming possibility of establishing socialism in an underdeveloped country" by those who blame Bolsheviks, particularly Stalin, for distorting Marxism with an economist deviation.

With the widespread criteria and in the final analysis, Russia was underdeveloped in comparison with Germany or Britain. However, Russia was also "beyond" the "developed" capitalist countries in terms of certain criteria on economical level as well as when more complex levels are involved such as culture, politics and ideology. Besides, it is inevitable that a comparison with reference to capitalism and another comparison based on socialist constitution yield different results at the same levels. For example, in terms of economical foundations of transition to socialism in Russia, the country has a series of features that allow us to assert that it has better potentials than France, if not than Germany. When we compare the capitalist development trend in rural areas of France and the destroying effect of capitalism on peasants in Russia, it can be easily seen that the concepts "underdeveloped" and "developed" remain far from being illuminating.

Many Marxists agree that the law of uneven development particularly fed the revolutionary potentials in Russia. For example, despite relative weakness of capital, the striking development of novel-writing and symphonic music, which are always mentioned with bourgeois revolutions, should be conceived as a result indicating the richness and concentration of contradictions at some levels, even if it is not very significant by itself. Besides, with the transition from structure to superstructure, the dialectics of continuity-disengagement gains a rather dynamic character.

All these do not suggest that we should leave aside the influence of being an underdeveloped society in many aspects that hardened the socialist construction process in Russia. All in all, the Soviet power spent considerable energy to compensate for the deficits, and had to mobilize significant resources to promote industrialization and, even more important, to deal with the problems in education. However, there is no reason to think that socialist constitution was driven by a "constant" energy. It should be assumed that the power spared to support the weight on the revolution due to "underdevelopment" was or could be used in other areas.

In brief, the claim that "Russia was too underdeveloped to allow a socialist construction" is incorrect.

Fourth thesis: "The Soviet Union could not bear the burden of civil war, collectivization and the World War II."

Some of those arguing that dissolution of socialism in the Soviet Union was inevitable suggest that the country lacked the sources to compensate for the material loss that occurred during consecutive "destructive" periods. These periods refer to the civil war (and foreign intervention that followed), collectivization and the World War II.

At first glance, collectivization is distinguished from the other two periods as it was something preferred by the Soviet power. Besides, the defendants of "inevitable dissolution" fail to respect such preference and claim that the Soviet Union lost the sources to carry it on further phases of socialism during the consecutive periods of struggle that came between 1917 and 1945.

It does not seem possible to equate all of the defenders of the idea. Some of the defenders of the idea that "dissolution resulted from consumption of sources" focus on the years of civil war, while some others focus on the collectivization attempt which sharpened class struggle in agriculture, and the rest concentrate on the World War II, when more than 20 million citizens of the Soviet Union died.

Each of these focuses can be handled individually.

It can be said that the civil war following the October Revolution, and the imperialist intervention dramatically battered the first socialist country, yet this is a deficient expression; because the Soviet Russia not only paid a cost during the "hot war" period right after the revolution, but it also paid the cost of Russian reactionaries who stood with Britain and France during the imperialist war. When calculated by years, it is seen that the October Revolution had to bear the burden of a war that sums up to a total of seven years.

The damage of these seven years on the class foundations of the socialist power in Russia cannot be overlooked. This weakness of the Russian proletariat, whose quantitative limits were already obvious, was balanced by concentration at certain centers. Nevertheless, it was clear that the class foundation of the socialist power was weakened along with the Russian working class who were worn by first the conflicts on the fronts, then by the famine in cities. Equally important was the erosion that hit the cadre structure of the party.

Some labeled this erosion as the "end of the party" while pointing at "Stalin's unpreventable rise" as the reason. They say Stalin had crowded the rural and inexperienced members to the places of the workers' cadres abandoned during the civil war, and thus succeeded in creating an apparatus that would remain loyal to him for many years!

Loss of the workers' cadres during the war and the following civil war indeed weakened the class character of the party. Nevertheless, the idea that the loss was irredeemable or rendered dissolution inevitable is quite an exaggeration. The validity of evaluations that defend the cadres replacing these workers were "underdeveloped" in cultural and political terms is also debatable. It should be remembered that the Soviet Russia did not inherit any urban workers from third generation and that the industrial proletariat always fed upon the devastated villages. The idea of a Russian worker totally isolated from the rural culture in 1917 and the following years is impossible; that could only be a hero in a fairy tale in that period.

There is nothing more natural than the leading party of the socialist constitution turning its face to rural areas to prevent the weakening among the working class in a country as broad as the Soviet Union.

Along with this discussion, it is very interesting that the collectivization period, which led to a great leap in the total number of proletarians and corrected the obliqueness in the class character of the Soviet Union, is declared as the death decree of the Soviets. Among the defenders of this idea, those claiming that the Soviet Union once again experienced a dramatic decrease in the population during the liquidation of the propertied class in agriculture should be taken seriously. What should be focused here is the claim that collectivization irreversibly eliminated in the Soviet Union any possibility for the society to develop in peace. It is meaningful that this claim was frequently expressed particularly when pro-Gorbachev clique gnawed on the Soviet Union. Although the issue has different and more important dimensions, it should be noted that the thesis defending that the socialist constitutions was derailed due to the collectivization that began in the late 1920's and resulted in liquidation of the rich propertied peasants in the rural areas, and that it could never recover has been harped on by the pro-perestroika clowns between 1987 and 1989. It is obvious that the actors of counter-revolution needed to shake the belief in any kind of "revolutionary" transformation" while putting fatal impacts on the Soviets.

The idea that the Soviet Union run out of breath during the years of World War II deserves a distinguished evaluation. Almost everybody knows the resulting figures in the war. The Soviet Union lost more than 20 million of its citizens during the WWII. It is obvious that this is the worst tragedy ever. The injured, the cities destroyed completely, and thousands of villages evacuated, broad lands that became infertile for at least several years, the forests burned down

Above all is the social trauma that remained for years, perhaps until the dissolution... The political results of this trauma...

The World War II indeed inflicted a heavy blow on the Soviet Union. However, the "fatal" period of the war was between 1941 and 1945, the period of actual fighting, and this period was marked by triumph, preventing the danger. The threat that results from elimination of huge sources for victory in the war was no greater than the threat of German fascism.

If the Soviet people, having taught a lesson to the Nazis, did not move on to further objectives after recovering the damages of war, this cannot be associated only with the consumption of sources. Even if it was clear that the WWII significantly harmed the Soviet Union in economical, political and ideological terms, and that the damages affected the dissolution process, it cannot be claimed that the country entered the year 1946 as a "defeated" country.

Therefore, the claim that the Soviet Union entered the dissolution process because it failed to bear the burden of challenging consecutive bends is not correct. All these periods can be evaluated as evidence for the power and capabilities of the Soviet Union.